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Introduction
Should state legislators give equal weight to the well-being of all
U.S. citizens? Or should they rather advance in-state interests at the ex-
pense of out-of-staters? This is a problem that the Supreme Court must
regularly confront, whenever out-of-staters claim that their treatment vi-
olates the dormant Commerce Clause, the Article IV Privileges and Im-
munities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or some other provision
that might prohibit state parochialism. As yet, the Court has not given a
clear answer.
This Article seeks to provide one. I will argue that the state legisla-
tor owes a general duty of impartiality to the citizens of other states-
that the legislator should always give equal weight to the out-of-stater's
well-being, ceteris paribus, at some level of generality.
By contrast, the "parochialist" view is that state legislators should
give zero weight to the out-of-stater's well-being, absent some federal
side-constraint. A federal side-constraint is a statutory or constitutional
norm that accords out-of-staters specific equality rights or substantive
rights. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Constitution contains
(at least) an anti-protectionism side-constraint under the dormant Coin-
* J.D., Yale Law School, 1991. Many, many thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Daniel Egger,
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merce Clause, a fair taxation side-constraint under the same provision,
and an anti-discrimination side-constraint under the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause of Article IV. The first precludes tariffs, quotas, embar-
goes, and other devices that are designed to improve the competitive
position of in-state economic actors at the expense of their out-of-state
competitors.' The second requires that a tax must not "discriminate
against interstate commerce" and that it must be "applied to an activity
with a substantial nexus with the taxing State," "fairly apportioned," and
"fairly related to the services provided by the State." 2 The third prohib-
its the state from discriminating against outsiders in certain "fundamen-
tal" ways.3 These rules are side-constraints because they have limited
scope. They define the boundaries within which the state should seek to
advance the well-being of in-staters, or so the parochialist argues. For
example, the side-constraints listed here do not require the state legisla-
tor to share the state fisc with outsiders, nor do the rules prohibit facially
neutral, non-protectionist statutes that adversely affect outsiders. Under
the parochialist model, the state legislator should spend tax revenues for
the sole benefit of in-staters, and ignore outsiders' interests in choosing
between facially-neutral, non-protectionist statutes.4
The parochialist model better comports with our intuitions. We in-
tuit that the state legislator's obligation to serve in-staters flows from the
very fact that states are political communities: that states have a citizenry
which elects the state government. "Nonrepresentation of [out-of-state]
interests follows from the simple fact that there are separate states."5
This intuition is wrong, as I explain in part L.A below. Although "citi-
zenship" is a non-empty concept, which entails and grounds various dis-
tinctions between in-staters and out-of-staters, the existence of these
distinctions does not preclude state impartiality. Rather, it is the impar-
tial legislator's task to take account of the distinctions.
Part I.B analyzes the Supreme Court case law. The case law does
not clearly decide whether state legislators should generally take an im-
partial or a parochial point of view. Although the Court now construes
1. See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1095 (1986).
2. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
3. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 387-88 (1978) ("With
respect to... basic and essential activities, interference with which would frustrate the pur-
poses of the formation of the Union, the States must treat residents and nonresidents without
unnecessary distinctions. ... [These] activities [are] 'fundamental' under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. .. ").
4. Cf. ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 2833 (1974) (describing
"side---constraint" model of individual moral action).
5. Regan, supra note 1, at 1164-65. Regan's article is more fully discussed infra note 67.
the dormant Commerce Clause and the Article IV Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause to embody only side-constraints and not a general imparti-
ality principle, the Court has also extended the Equal Protection Clause
to out-of-staters. I interpret the Equal Protection Clause cases as articu-
lating a general impartiality principle which is binding on state legisla-
tors but not enforced by the Court. This is a colorable, albeit
controversial, interpretation.
Part IC reviews the academic literature. Constitutional scholars
have generally argued against state parochialism, but their arguments
have not been very persuasive. Anti-parochialist scholars have tended to
ignore that parochialism may well be legitimate at the level of the nation-
state. It may well be true that France should generally ignore Aus-
tralians' interests, or at least the interests of Australians nonresident in
France, absent some international side-constraint. The opponent of state
parochialism can: (a) show that parochialism is never legitimate, includ-
ing nation-state parochialism; or (b) concede that nation-state parochial-
ism may be legitimate, but show why the states are different from nation-
states. The existing anti-parochialist literature fails to prove either
proposition.
This article seeks to prove the latter. Rather than focusing on the
Constitution's text and history, as other anti-parochialist scholars have
done, I will advance a structural argument for state impartiality. What
would a well-reasoning Framer require of state legislators, given other
features of the Constitution in its current form? Part II shows that this
imaginative exercise does not endorse state parochialism, but rather im-
pugns it. Part II.A considers a concrete case: Would the well-reasoning
Framer instruct the state legislator to take a parochial point of view in
distributing the state fisc? Is the legislator required to exclude outsiders
from receipt of state monies, even absent some impartial justification for
doing so? The answer is no, for a variety of reasons. These reasons are
elaborated and generalized in part II.B. To summarize them: the
Framer might well believe that out-of-state interests should not deter-
mine a given decision by state legislators, but because legislators are per-
fectly competent to evaluate out-of-state interests, this belief is not a
sufficient ground for imposing a constitutional requirement that legisla-
tors ignore out-of-state interests with respect to that decision.
It is a separate question whether the Framer would choose to have
the federal courts enforce the duty of impartiality on the state legislator.
This Article does not purport to answer that question. Even if the impar-
tiality principle is unenforced, the principle exists nonetheless and is
binding on state legislators. The state legislator has the constitutional
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obligation to consider the well-being of all U.S. citizens, and not just of
in-staters.
I. Defining the Problem
A. Impartiality and Equal Treatment
The thesis of this Article is that the Constitution imposes a general
duty of impartiality on the state legislator. This duty requires the legisla-
tor to take an impartial point of view towards out-of-staters with respect
to every legislative decision. The legislator takes "an impartial point of
view" with respect to a particular decision by giving out-of-state interests
equal weight, ceteris paribus, at some level of generality, in determining
that decision. "Ceteris paribus" means that out-of-staters' interests can
be given unequal or even zero weight if the legislator has good reason for
doing so. "At some level of generality" means that the legislator can
make an impartial meta-decision to ignore outsiders' interests in resolv-
ing this particular decision.6 In short, the legislator takes an impartial
point of view towards out-of-staters if their interests are given reasoned
consideration. A general duty of impartiality means that the legislator
must always give reasoned consideration to out-of-state interests.7
Impartiality is crucially different from equal treatment. The concept
of equal treatment has a variety of meanings. It can mean identical treat-
ment or equally favorable treatment. Whatever it means, the equal treat-
ment of outsiders does not invariably follow from the legislator's
impartial point of view. The legislator who takes an impartial point of
view, who gives reasoned consideration to out-of-state interests, may well
identify some reason for distinguishing between in-staters and out-of-sta-
ters. This legislator may ultimately promulgate a statute that discrimi-
nates against outsiders or that has a disparate impact upon them. In
other words, the legislator may accord them "unequal treatment," how-
ever defined. In Toomer v. Witsell,8 the Supreme Court most forcefully
and elegantly expressed this idea: "[impartiality] does not preclude dis-
parity of treatment in the many situations where there are perfectly valid
6. The concept of impartiality "at some level of generality" is more fully explicated be-
low. See infra text accompanying notes 118-20.
7. The idea of impartiality is commonplace in liberal moral theory. See, e.g., BRUCE
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 419 (1980); BRIAN BARRY, THEORIES
OF JUSTICE 282-92, 357-66 (1989); RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-78
(1977); ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 12950 (1978). Constitutional lawyers are
familiar with Dworkin's notion of "equal concern and respect," which is one version of this
idea.
8. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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independent reasons for it."9
These "perfectly valid independent reasons" exist because the states
are political communities. States have members (citizens) and nonmem-
bers (noncitizens), and the members have a number of defining charac-
teristics. First, they reside in the state. State residents have a right to
citizenship.' 0 Conversely, the state has the authority to exclude nonresi-
dents from citizenship."
Second, state citizens have the full right to participate in state poli-
tics. The state has the authority to reserve electoral and certain office-
holding rights for its citizens. 2 Noncitizens may lobby the state legisla-
ture or deliberate about state issues, but are barred at a minimum from
voting in state elections. Thus, whatever democratic obligation the state
legislator owes to the state electorate, that obligation is only owed to in-
9. Id. at 396.
10. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
11. See, eg., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972) ("An appropriately defined
and uniformly applied requirement of bona fide residence may be necessary to preserve the
basic conception of a political community."). The Court generally uses the terms "citizen"
and "resident" as synonyms. See Gary J. Simson, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. PA. L. Rav. 379, 380 nn. 10-11 (1979)
(citing cases).
12. See Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1978) ("No decision of this
Court has extended the 'one man, one vote' principle to individuals residing beyond the geo-
graphic confines of the governmental entity concerned, be it the State or its political subdivi-
sions. On the contrary, our cases have uniformly recognized that a government unit may
legitimately restrict the right to participate in its political processes to those who reside within
its borders."); Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343 ("IThe States have the power to require that voters be
bona fide residents of the relevant political subdivision."). For cases where the Court has
upheld State residency requirements for political rights, see Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679
(1973) (per curiam) (50day durational residency requirement for state franchise); Kanapaux v.
Ellisor, 419 U.S. 891 (1974) (residency requirement for state elective office); Sununu v. Stark,
383 F. Supp. 1287 (D. N.H. 1974), affid, 420 U.S. 958 (1975) (same); Chimento v. Stark, 353
F. Supp. 1211 (D. N.H. 1973), affid, 414 U.S. 802 (1973) (same).
In Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), an alienage case, the Court stated in dictum
that "[t]his power and responsibility of the State applies, not only to the qualifications of vot-
ers, but also to persons holding state elective or important nonelective executive, legislative,
and judicial positions, for officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or
review of broad public policy perform functions that go to the heart of representative govern-
ment." Id. at 647. The Court subsequently upheld the exclusion of aliens from various "polit-
ical jobs," and presumably out-of-staters could be denied those jobs as well. See Cabell v.
Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (probation officer); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68
(1979) (public school teacher); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (policeman). Cf
Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988) (voiding state discrimination against
out-of-state lawyers); Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (voiding state
exclusion of out-of-state lawyers from state bar); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (void-
ing state exclusion of aliens from position of notary public); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)
(voiding state exclusion of aliens from state bar).
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staters. Perhaps the legislator must do what the majority of voters would
want if the voters were fully informed and rational. Or perhaps the legis-
lator must do what the majority of voters actually want, even if irrational
or uninformed, if they want that with sufficient intensity. The demo-
cratic obligation is a general concept, and these are specific concep-
tions. 13 But whatever conception a particular state adopts, it covers only
the citizen-electors.
Third and finally, citizens are fully liable to state authority. They
have a complete jurisdictional connection to the state. This is the flip
side of full participation. To be sure, noncitizens are not wholly exempt
from state power, just as they are not wholly excluded from the political
process. The state has territorial jurisdiction over citizens and nonci-
tizens alike. The fact that an activity takes place inside the state's terri-
tory is a legitimate predicate for state regulation, or adjudication, or
taxation of that activity. However, the actor's citizenship is an independ-
ent predicate. Persons may be sued in state courts, or have their income
taxed, or be subject to the state's civil law simply because they belong to
the state.14 This is domiciliary jurisdiction.15
13. See infra text accompanying notes 108-12.
14. See LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FED-
ERAL SYSTEM (1986); see also Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism, Community, and State Borders, 41
DUKE L.J. 1 (1991) (distinguishing between "specific jurisdiction," i.e., territorial jurisdiction,
and "general jurisdiction," i.e., domiciliary jurisdiction).
It is an oversimplification to say that states always have general jurisdiction over their
citizens. First, citizenship is simply aprimafacie reason for jurisdiction. The state legislator
may decide that this reason is less weighty than location, and cede jurisdiction to the state that
has territorial jurisdiction. For example, State A choice-of-law doctrine may prescribe that,
where an accident takes place in State B, State B tort law applies, even if State 4 citizens are
involved. And for some kinds of jurisdiction, regulatory jurisdiction, for example, territorial
location is the only basis; in such a case the state legislator does not have the option of exercis-
ing general jurisdiction. See Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legisla-
tion, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1865 (1987). However, citizenship is a prima facie reason for other
sorts of civil jurisdiction. gee Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (choice of law);
Terry S. Kogan, 4 Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 257 (1990)
(civil adjudicative jurisdiction); Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business, 41
TAx LAWYER 37 (1987) (tax jurisdiction).
15. Domiciliary jurisdiction is simply the flip side of participation. When a state regulates
citizens' out-of-state activities, or taxes their income earned out-of-state, it legitimately does so
because the citizens participate in framing state regulations and spending programs: they elect
the legislator, and the legislator owes them some kind of democratic obligation. This is an
impartial justification fQr exercising domiciliary jurisdiction over state citizens, and conversely
for allowing the out-of-staters' home states to exercise domiciliary jurisdiction over them.
Ceteris paribus, state law should govern state citizens, because they fully participate in the
framing of that law. Brainerd Currie and his followers have offered "interest analysis" as an
alternative, parochial theory of domiciliary jurisdiction, and Currie's anti-parochialist critics
have generally argued for a territorial approach to choice of law. See Douglas Laycock, Equal
Residence, plus the full right to participate in state politics, plus a
complete jurisdictional connection, are the core characteristics of state
citizenship. The state citizen has at least these features, and other fea-
tures may flow from them.16 For example, the state may pool and spend
citizens' resources for the citizens' benefit. If so, citizenship means mem-
bership in this resource-pooling enterprise. 7 Or citizens may view the
state as a "community" in the sense that Michael Walzer, Alasdair
MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, and other so-called "communitarians" de-
scribe.1 In other words, the citizen may constitute his or her well-being
in terms of political participation or other communal practices and
Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 249, 252-56 (1992) (reviewing literature). Nevertheless, there is no necessary
connection between territorialism and anti-parochialism. See Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness
and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989) (anti-parochial justification for domiciliary
jurisdiction).
16. Cf Geraint Parry, Conclusion: Paths to Citizenship, in THE FRONTIERS OF CzEN-
SHIP, 166 (U. Vogel and M. Moran eds., 1991) (describing different models of citizenship).
17. More concretely, state citizens may be "shareholders" in a "corporation" constituted
by the state. Judge Cardozo brilliantly articulated this concept of the state as a private corpo-
ration in People v. Crane, 108 N.E. 427 (1915), which upheld the exclusion of aliens from the
New York public works.
The people, viewed as an organized unit, constitute the state ... [which is thus]
conceived of as a body corporate. Like any other body corporate, it may enter into
contracts, and hold and dispose of property. In doing this, it acts through agencies of
government. These agencies, when contracting for the state, or expending the state's
moneys, are trustees for the people of the state.
Crane, 108 N.E. at 429. The private corporation concept repeatedly appears in the Supreme
Court's out-of-stater cases, particularly those cases involving positive rights. In Article IV
jurisprudence there has long been a "common property" doctrine, that conceptualizes state
citizens as the co-owners of in-state natural resources. "[Citizens], and they alone, owned the
property to be sold or used, and they alone had the power to dispose of it as they saw fit."
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 396 (1876); see infra note 22 (discussing "common prop-
erty" doctrine). Similarly, the "market participant" exception to the dormant Commerce
Clause conceptualizes the state as a "private business." "There is no indication of a constitu-
tional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely in the free market ....
Restraint in this area is... [counseled by] 'the long recognized right of trader or manufac-
turer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion
as to parties with whom he will deal.'" Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437-39 (1980)
(quoting United States v. Colgate and Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)); see infra note 24 (dis-
cussing "market participant" doctrine). Both the "market participant" and "common prop-
erty" doctrines are particular applications of the private corporation concept. Cf Michael
Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law,
66 VA. L. REv. 1073 (1980) (discussing other instances of the idea of government as private
entity).
18. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1984); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBER-
ALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is
Republicanism and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1695 (1989) (describing and
criticizing communitarianism); Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Com-
munity, 90 MICH. L. REv. 685 (1992) (same); Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Lib-
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thereby develop special bonds with fellow citizens, as if they were friends
or co-religionists.19
Because state citizenship is not an empty concept, noncitizens do
not have a general right to equal treatment. "The exclusion of [nonci-
tizens] from basic governmental processes is not a deficiency in the dem-
ocratic system but a necessary consequence of the community's process
of political self-definition. . . . [Noncitizens] are by definition those
outside of this community."20 Noncitizens, by definition, do not vote.
And where citizenship also means membership in a resource-pooling
scheme, noncitizens need not share in whatever privileges legitimately
flow from such membership. Where citizens view citizenship as a consti-
tutive, communal practice, which entails a certain loyalty and affection
for fellow-citizens, they need not give outsiders the legitimate benefits of
that loyalty and affection.
In particular, the Constitution does not guarantee the out-of-stater
equal positive rights. As the Court stated in Truax v. Raich, a 1915 deci-
sion: "the public domain... [and] the common property or resources of
the people of the State... may be limited to its citizens as against.., the
citizens of other States."21 The modem rule is somewhat narrower. Out-
of-staters do have a constitutional equality right to certain state-con-
trolled natural resources. 22 But they have no right to share in the state
eralism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFr. 308 (1985) (same); Paul W. Kahn, Community in
Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1 (1989) (same).
19. I will call a community that is constitutive of the citizen's well-being or some other
aspect of the citizen's identity a "thick community." For purposes of this article, I assume
that the Constitution permits the state political community to be "thick."
20. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1982). Cabell is an alienage case, but
its reasoning also covers out-of-staters.
21. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1915).
22. In the nineteenth century, the Court conceptualized in-state, unowned natural re-
sources as the citizens' "common property," which they might reserve for themselves. See,
e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U,S. 519 (1896) (wild game; relying on "common property"
exception to dormant Commerce Clause), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (oysters; relying on "common property"
exception to Article IV); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) (in-
state oysters; relying on "common property" exception to Article IV). The concept had a
more checkered career in the early twentieth century. Parochial natural-resource policies were
at times upheld. See Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) (wild game; aliens excluded
plus dictum that out-of-staters could be excluded as well); Hudson County Water Co. v. Mc-
Carter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908) (water). At other times, such resource policies were overturned.
See Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (shrimp); Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (natural gas); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229
(1911) (natural gas). Then, in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), the Court squarely
rejected the common property exception to Article IV and struck down a state licensing
scheme that discriminated against out-of-state shrimp fishermen. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322 (1979), extended Toomer to the dormant Commerce Clause, holding that protection-
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fise. In general, neither the prohibition on "fundamental" discrimination
embodied in Article IV,23 nor the anti-protectionism rule of the dormant
ist resource policies would be voided. At the same time, however, Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 385-86 (1978) reintroduced the common property concept into Article
IV jurisprudence, as a presumption rather than an exception. Under Baldwin's approach, a
state may legitimately reserve for in-staters certain in-state, unowned natural resources.
There is an extensive scholarly literature on this subject. See FISCAL FEDERALISM AND
THE TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES (Charles E. McClure ed., 1983); Thomas K. Anson
& P.M. Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause and State-Owned Resources,
58 TEX. L. REv. 71 (1980); Walter Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the Com-
merce Clause, and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979 Sup. Cr. REv. 51; Saul Levmore,
Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563 (1983); Carol A. Fortine,
Note, The Commerce Clause and Federalism: Implications for State Control of Natural Re-
sources, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 601 (1982).
23. On the Court's construction of Article IV as prohibiting "fundamental" discrimina-
tion, see infra text accompanying notes 39-43. It is clear from the case law that this prohibi-
tion does not generally cover state spending. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never required
that a state include out-of-staters in its spending programs. The so-called "durational resi-
dency" cases simply held that new residents may not be excluded from various such programs.
See Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (civil service employment);
Hooper v. Bernalillo County, 472 U.S. 612 (1985) (tax exemption); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S.
55 (1982) (distribution of state surplus); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1974) (medical care); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare). See generally
William Cohen, Equal Treatment for Newcomers, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 9 (1984); Bryan H.
Wildenthal, Note, State Parochialism, the Right to Travel, and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1557 (1989). Soon after Shapiro v. Thompson, the
Court voided state welfare programs that excluded aliens who were resident in-state. See Gra-
ham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). But the durational-residency and alienage cases
scrupulously declined to say that nonresidents would have to be included as well and indeed
suggested the opposite. See, eg., Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 267; see also Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973). Then, in the early 1970s,
higher tuition rates for out-of-staters at state universities were summarily affirmed. See Sturgis
v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Wash. 1973), aft'd, 414 U.S. 1057 (1973); Starns v.
Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), afl'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971); see also McCarthy v.
Philadelphia Civil Service Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding municipal
residency requirement for municipal employment as applied to out-of-stater). Finally, in Mar-
tinez v. Bynum, which upheld a state residence requirement for free public education, the
Court discussed the case law at length and made it quite clear that state residence is generally a
legitimate condition for the receipt of tax-funded benefits. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321,
325 (1983) ("On several occasions the Court has invalidated requirements that condition re-
ceipt of a benefit on a minimum period of residence within a jurisdiction, but it always has been
careful to distinguish such durational residence requirements from bona fide residence require-
ments."). I see Bynum as the leading Supreme Court case for the proposition that out-of-
staters need not share in the state fisc. But see Laycock, supra note 15, at 271 n.139 (arguing
that Bynum language is dictum).
The Bynum Court qualified its general principle by noting that "the 'service' that the State
would deny to nonresidents [cannot be] a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. A
state, for example, may not refuse to provide counsel to an indigent nonresident defendant at a
criminal trial where a deprivation of liberty occurs." Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 n.7. Presuma-
bly, too, the Constitution would prohibit a state from denying police protection to out-of-
staters or banishing them from state roads, even if the roads and the police were wholly funded
from the state fisc. Jonathan Varat, who has analyzed this problem at some length, takes the
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Commerce Clause,24 covers the state's expenditure of its monies. The
only side-constraint that does apply is the anti-expropriation rule of
Complete Auto Transit v. Brady: a state's tax on out-of-staters must be
"fairly related to the services provided by the State."25 In other words,
out-of-staters have a constitutional right to the monies that they contrib-
uted. But they have no right at all-not a right to equal treatment, and
surely not a substantive right-to monies that were contributed by in-
staters. There are myriad potential reasons, flowing from the concept of
"citizenship," why the state legislator might reserve in-staters' resources
for in-staters.26
Yet it remains an open question whether the legislator, in distribut-
ing those resources, should take a parochial point of view. There are two
possibilities: either the reasons for excluding outsiders from the state fisc
are evaluated by the legislator, and perhaps ultimately found to justify
exclusion; or outsiders are excluded simply because that result is not
barred by Article IV, the dormant Commerce Clause, or any other side
constraint. The parochial legislator reasons: "Out-of-staters have no
constitutional right to share in the state fisc; therefore I should exclude
them." The impartial legislator takes a different approach: "Out-of-sta-
ters have no constitutional right to share in the state fisc, but it still may
view that "when a state uses state revenues to create public goods and services, it has a prima
facie justification for allocating those resources to state residents ... ." Jonathan D. Varat,
State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. R v. 487, 529 (1981) (emphasis
added). I will assume arguendo that this prima facie justification is almost always a conclusive
justification for purposes of constitutional law. In other words, I will assume that the Consti-
tution almost never requires the state to share in-staters' resources with out-of-staters. My
aim, here, is to show that the Constitution requires state impartiality in the distribution of in-
staters' resources even if it does not require equal treatment. See infra part II.A.
24. The leading case here is Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), which
involved the preferential subsidization of in-state scrap processors. Alexandria Scrap found
that the subsidy program was outside the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause. "Nothing
in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State... from participating in the
market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others." Id at 810. Essentially,
Alexandria Scrap and the subsequent "market participant" cases mean that the anti-protec-
tionism side-constraint embodied in the dormant Commerce Clause does not reach so far as to
cover tax-funded benefits. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S.
204 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); see also New Energy Co. v. Limbach,
486 U.S. 269 (1988) (market-participant exception does not apply); South-Central Timber
Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (same). "[T]he Commerce Clause responds princi-
pally to state taxes and regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national market-
place." Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436-37. See generally Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-
Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395 (1989); Mark
P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEx. L. Rv. 1097 (1988).
25. 430 U.S. 274,279 (1977). See Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 17 (discussing Complete
Auto Transit).
26. See infra part II.A.
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be wrong to exclude them. Citizenship may or may not constitute a rea-
son for differential treatment, and that is an issue for me to resolve."
Even if the two legislators reach an identical result, the impartial legisla-
tor employs a very different process of justification, a process that in
other cases will produce an outcome that no constitutional side-con-
straint compels and that the parochial legislator will therefore reject.
The constitutional concept of citizenship necessarily means that
non-citizens lack a general right to equal treatment.27 But it does not
necessarily vitiate a general duty of impartiality. Perhaps state legisla-
tors must themselves decide whether citizenship constitutes a relevant
distinction, even absent a federal side-constraint. The fact that states are
political communities does not, by itself, prove that state legislators
should be parochial.
B. The Case Law
The Supreme Court case law concerning out-of-staters is open to
two different interpretations, as I will try to show in this section. The
first interpretation is that the Constitution does not require state imparti-
ality. The second is that this requirement exists yet is partially unen-
forced by the federal courts.2" Although the dormant Commerce Clause
and the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause are not now under-
stood to embody a broad impartiality principle, as they once were, out-
of-staters are also protected by the "rational basis" component of the
Equal Protection Clause. But "rational basis review" is ineffectual: pa-
rochial state laws will survive it. The parochialist views the "rational
basis" component of the Equal Protection Clause as a legal fiction, which
amounts to no obligation at all for state legislators. By contrast, I view it
as an impartiality norm that is binding on state legislators whether or not
the federal courts will enforce it.
The famous case of Corfield v. Coryel1 9 exemplifies the side-con-
27. My position is quite different from those legal scholars who argue that out-of-staters
have a general equal treatment right, subject only to certain narrow exceptions such as the
state franchise. See, eg., Laycock, supra note 15, at 261-73; Varat, supra note 23, at 487-94;
Simson, supra note 11, at 386-89. If out-of-staters lack a wide range of political rights and
positive rights, as they legitimately do, then equal treatment is hardly the general norm.
28. Constitutional norms may well be unenforced. See infra text accompanying notes 84-
85.
29. 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). Corfield, rather than a Supreme Court
opinion, is the best example of the pre-Civil War view of Article IV. Very few Article IV cases
reached the Court prior to the Civil War, and the Court in these cases declined to provide the
full gloss furnished by Justice Washington in Corfield. See, e.g., Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. 591,
593 (1855) ("We do not deem it needful to attempt to define the meaning of the word privileges
in this clause of the constitution.... [W]e are dealing with so broad a provision.., that any
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straint model. A New Jersey statute that forbade out-of-state fishermen
from taking oysters in state waters was challenged under Article IV. Jus-
tice Washington, sitting as Circuit Justice, rejected the challenge. He
understood Article IV as no more than a guarantee of specific equality
rights and substantive rights.
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens in the several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these
expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their
nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free governments.... [These include] [t]he right of a citizen of one
state to pass through .. any other state, for purposes of trade,
agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit
of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of
any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of
property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher
taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state
30
These rights did not include the right to share in the state's natural re-
sources, which Corfield conceptualized as the "common property" of in-
staters.
They may be considered as tenants in common of this property;
and they are so exclusively entitled to the use of it, that it cannot be
enjoyed by others without the tacit consent, or the express permis-
sion of the sovereign who has the power to regulate its use.31
Nor did Justice Washington require the legislators to justify their distri-
bution of New Jersey's "common property." Corfield did not find a gen-
eral principle of impartiality anywhere in the Constitution.
Toomer v. Witsell32 is the opposite case. Toomer, like Corfield, in-
volved the exclusion of out-of-staters from in-state natural resources.
South Carolina had promulgated a licensing statute that discriminated
against out-of-state fishermen. But Chief Justice Vinson took a very dif-
ferent view of Article IV:
Like many other constitutional provisions, the privileges and im-
munities clause is not an absolute. It does bar discrimination
against citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason
for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens
of other States. But it does not preclude disparity of treatment in
the many situations where there are perfectly valid independent
reasons for it.33
merely abstract definition could scarcely be correct; and a failure to make it so would certainly
produce mischief.").
30. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
31. Id. at 552.
32. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
33. Id. at 396.
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This general impartiality principle covered the state's distribution of in-
state resources, no less than other state decisions.
The whole ownership theory [i.e., common property], in fact, is
now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal short-
hand of the importance to its people that a State have power to
preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource.
And there is no necessary conflict between that vital policy consid-
eration and the constitutional command that the State exercise that
power, like its other powers, so as not to discriminate without rea-
son against citizens of other States.34
Moreover, the principle would be enforced by the federal judiciary.
"Thus the [udicial] inquiry in each case must be concerned with whether
such reasons do exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a
close relation to them."35 Because the Toomer Court could find no im-
partial justification for the South Carolina scheme-because "non-citi-
zens [did not] constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute
[was] aimed" 3 6-it struck down the statute.
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona 37 is the dormant Commerce Clause an-
alogue to Toomer. While the Toomer Court enforced a principle forbid-
ding unjustified discrimination, the Southern Pacific Court engaged in
"balancing." Arguably implicit in Southern Pacific was the principle
that the state legislator, in regulating commerce, should give equal
weight to out-of-staters' interests:
[There are an] infinite variety of cases, in which regulation of local
matters may also operate as a regulation of commerce, in which
reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state and national power
is to be attained only by some appraisal and accommodation of the
competing demands of the state and national interests involved
... [W]here Congress has not acted, this Court, and not the
state legislature, is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of
the competing demands of state and national interests.38
While Toomer demands a justification for discriminatory statutes, South-
ern Pacific covers facially-neutral statutes as well, but only where they
involve commerce. Yet both Toomer's Article IV norm and Southern
34. Id. at 402.
35. Id. at 396.
36. Id. at 398.
37. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
38. Id. at 768-69. "National interests" might be read narrowly as including only certain
kinds of interests shared by out-of-staters and in-staters, eg., an interest in the free flow of
goods, or it might be read more broadly to include any legitimate interest held by a U.S.
citizen. See Regan, supra note 1, at 1101-04.
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Pacific's Commerce Clause norm are approximations to a general impar-
tiality principle. Both go well beyond some narrow side-constraint.
But Southern Pacific and Toomer are no longer the law of the land.
The Court no longer interprets Article IV and the dormant Commerce
Clause as incorporating an impartiality principle. Toomer's approach
was abandoned in Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n,39 which is
now the leading Article IV case. Baldwin upheld a Montana statute that
discriminated against out-of-state hunters. The Baldwin Court construed
the Privileges and Immunities Clause to provide the out-of-stater a set of
"fundamental" equality rights.
There are a "range of activities that are sufficiently basic to
the livelihood of the Nation that the States may not interfere with a
nonresident's participation therein without similarly interfering
with a resident's participation. [These] rights or activities [are
'fundamental' under the Privileges and Immunities Clause ....
Where the regulated activity was fundamental, unjustifiable state dis-
crimination would be prohibited: "[w]ith respect to such basic and es-
sential activities, . . .the States must treat residents and nonresidents
without unnecessary distinctions."41 However, no such prohibition ap-
plied to "non-fundamental" activities. These simply "[did] not fall
within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause."42 In other
words, Baldwin read Article IV as a mere side-constraint (providing a
specific set of equality rights) just as Corfield had. In each case, out-of-
staters challenged a particular kind of differential treatment that the Ar-
ticle IV side-constraint did not cover: Montana's decision to exclude
out-of-state hunters in Baldwin and New Jersey's decision to exclude out-
of-state fishermen in Corfield. In each case, Article IV was not inter-
preted to require an impartial justification for that kind of differential
treatment.
The movement in Article IV doctrine from Toomer to Baldwin is
paralleled by the Court's abandonment of Southern Pacific. Donald Re-
gan has analyzed the dormant Commerce Clause case law and argues
that the Court no longer balances in-state against out-of-state interests.
Just as Article IV has been reinterpreted to embody a narrow prohibition
on "fundamental" discrimination, so the dormant Commerce Clause
39. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
40. Id. at 388. Subsequent Article IV cases include Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518
(1978); United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984); Supreme Court
of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) ; Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988).
These cases generally follow the Baldwin approach. That approach had been anticipated in
Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
41. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 387.
42. Id. at 388.
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may well have been narrowed to an anti-protectionism principle.43
But this reinterpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause does not necessarily vindicate the
parochialist. One plausible interpretation of a case like Baldwin is that it
articulates but does not enforce a broad impartiality principle, which is
located in the Fourteenth Amendment rather than Articles I or IV.
Scholars have generally ignored the last section of Baldwin,' where the
Court considered an equal protection challenge and rejected that chal-
lenge on the merits. The Court stated that "[w]e need not commit our-
selves to any particular method of computing the cost to the State of
maintaining an environment in which elk can survive in order to find the
State's efforts rational, and not invidious, and therefore not violative of
the Equal Protection Clause."4 What is crucial is that the Court did
reach the merits. Baldwin assumed that the Equal Protection Clause ap-
plied to "distinctions drawn between residents and nonresidents," even
where such distinctions were not "fundamental" and therefore did not
"fall within the purview" of Article IV.
What did the Court mean when it said that Montana's discrimina-
tory scheme would have to be "rational"? I follow Cass Sunstein in as-
serting that the rational-basis component of the Equal Protection Clause
can plausibly be interpreted as an impartiality principle.
[The] function [of the rational basis test] is to ensure that classifica-
tions rest on something other than a naked preference for one per-
son or group over another. Thus, to take the most familiar
example, in Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955),
the Court upheld differential treatment of optometrists and opti-
cians on the ground not that the equal protection clause tolerated
an unprincipled distribution of wealth to one rather than to the
other.., but that the differential treatment was a means of protect-
ing consumers. The Court has made clear in rationality cases that
the government must be able to invoke some public value that the
classification at issue can be said to serve.46
43. Regan, supra note 1, at 1206-87. More specifically, Regan claims that "[i]n the central
area of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, comprising what I shall call 'movement-of-
goods' cases ... the Court has been concerned exclusively with preventing states from engag-
ing in purposeful economic protectionism," and concedes that "[i]n cases other than move-
ment-of-goods cases--cases involving regulation of railroads or highways, cases about taxation
- the Court has had certain limited goals over and above preventing protectionism." Id at
1092.
44. See, ag., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-35 (1988);
Varat, supra note 23, at 509-15; Simson, supra note 11.
45. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 389.
46. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689,
1713 (1984); see Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Consti-
tutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218 (1978) ("The equal protection clause [can be
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On this view, a statute that discriminates between two persons has a "ra-
tional basis" only if the legislator has accorded those persons equal con-
cern and respect-only if the legislator has given their well-being equal
weight, ceteris paribus, at some level of generality.47 However, the ra-
tional-basis requirement is applied in so lax and tolerant a manner that
the challenged statute is inevitably upheld. "Application of this level of
review is in fact tantamount to a reflexive validation of the challenged
classification, because the 'test' incorporates a theory and practice of ex-
treme deference to the judgment of the enacting official or body."4 Fed-
eral courts have evolved various devices to find "rationality"; in
particular, the legislature need not articulate its "legitimate purpose,"
and the statute need not be narrowly tailored to that purpose.4 9
Baldwin supports and illustrates this interpretation of rational basis
review. The Baldwin Court adduced various justifications for the Mon-
tana statute: "[t]he resident obviously assists in the production and
maintenance of big-game populations through taxes"50; "[there has been]
an alarming... increase in the number of nonresident hunters""1 ; "the
nonresident occasional and short-term visitor is more likely to commit
game-law violations" 2; and "nonresident hunters create greater enforce-
ment problems."53 These are just the kinds of factors that could be rele-
vant to the impartial state legislator. Like Toomer, Baldwin made clear
that noncitizens should "constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which
the statute is aimed."54 However, by contrast with Toomer, which
grounded the impartiality principle in Article IV, Baldwin did not en-
force the principle. Instead the Court was quite deferential, as it nor-
mally is in seeking a rational basis. "That Montana might have furthered
its underlying purpose more artfully, more directly, or more completely,
does not warrant a conclusion that the method it chose is unconstitu-
tional."5  Although Toomer voided the challenged statute, Baldwin up-
seen] as a prominent example of a constitutional norm which is underenforced to a significant
degree by the federal judiciary .... ").
47. How about a facially neutral state statute that adversely affects out-of-staters? Must
this statute, too, have a "rational basis"? As far as I know, the Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed the issue. Thus the case law does not vindicate my theory as fully as it might. See
infra note 64.
48. Sager, supra note 46, at 1215.
49. See generally TRIBE, supra note 44, §§ 16-1 to 16-5.
50. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 389 (1978).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 390.
53. Id. at 391.
54. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948).
55. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 390 (citations omitted).
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held it, yet both decisions insisted that the state legislator have some
neutral reason for discriminating against out-of-staters.
Of course, it is possible to read Baldwin quite differently. The ra-
tional-basis component of the Equal Protection Clause could be a mere
fiction. The legislator's duty of "rationality" could be just the minimal
duty to refrain from passing statutes that the Court will strike down-
statutes that are patently arbitrary-and no more. This is the parochial-
ist's view, and I will not here try to refute it as a matter of textual inter-
pretation. My claim is simply that Baldwin and similar cases can
plausibly be interpreted as embodying an unenforced impartiality norm,
not that this is the only plausible interpretation. 6
Since the late nineteenth century, the Court has followed the Bald-
win approach and routinely applied the Equal Protection Clause to cases
where the state has discriminated between citizens and noncitizens." In
56. I may be conceding too much to the parochialist. The modem Court has more than
once voided discriminatory state taxes under the Equal Protection Clause. See generally Mat-
thew J. Zinn & Steven Reed, Equal Protection and State Taxation of Interstate Business, 41
TAx LAWYER 83 (1987). The most prominent example is Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward,
470 U.S. 869 (1985), where the Court voided a discriminatory tax on out-of-state insurance
companies. Metropolitan Life relied on the Equal Protection Clause because the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015, exempted state regulation of the insurance industry
from the dormant Commerce Clause.
Alabama's aim [in promulgating the tax] is purely and completely discrimina-
tory, designed only to favor domestic industry within the State, no matter what the
cost to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. Alabama's purpose...
constitutes the very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause
was intended to prevent.... [Tihis Court always has held that the Equal Protection
Clause forbids a State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by burden-
ing 'the residents of other state members of our federation.'
Metropolitan Life, 470 U.S. at 878 (citing Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 552, 533 (1959));
see also WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117 (1968) (voiding discriminatory tax exemption);
Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949) (voiding discriminatory tax). Metropoli-
tan Life has been heavily criticized as contravening congressional intent. See, eg., William
Cohen, Federalism in Equality Clothing: A Comment on Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 38
STAN. L. REv. 1 (1985). Whatever the merits of this criticism, Metropolitan Life also shows
that "[t]he equal protection clause.., has recently begun to emerge as a significant support
mechanism for the rights of out-of-state residents." Zinn & Reed, supra note 56, at 83. The
parochialist cannot argue that the clause is a complete "fiction" as regards out-of-staters be-
cause it embodies a judicially-enforced principle against parochial state taxation.
57. The clause has a qualifying phrase: it prohibits states from "deny[ing] to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; see
John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 173, 181 n.23 (1981) ("There is an initial if little noticed question whether the Equal
Protection Clause-whose protection, unlike that of its sister Due Process and Privileges and
Immunities Clauses, is limited to persons 'within [the state's] jurisdiction'--was meant to pro-
tect out-of-staters at all."). The qualifying phrase could be read to mean that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause does not cover out-of-staters who are not "within" the state. Indeed the phrase
was given this sort of reading in the out-of-state corporation cases, beginning with Philadelphia
Fire Ass'n. v. New York, 119 U.S. 110 (1886). See Western & So. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of
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particular, the Court has applied the Equal Protection Clause to out-of-
stater cases involving positive rights. In Baldwin, of course, the clause
was read to cover natural resources (wild animals). Martinez v. Bynum5"
and Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.59 repeated the Baldwin pattern
and showed that the state fisc was covered as well. Bynum upheld a
Texas statute limiting free public education to state residents. The Court
(implicitly) found that the Article IV side-constraint did not apply, but
then reviewed the statute for Equal Protection Clause rationality. "[A
residency] requirement with respect to attendance in public free schools
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment"'  because there is a rational basis for it.61 Alexandria Scrap in-
volved a Maryland program that gave preferential subsidies to in-state
scrap processors and held that the subsidy program was outside the
reach of the dormant Commerce Clause. "Nothing in the purposes ani-
mating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State... from participating in
the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over
others."62 Essentially, this "market participant" doctrine means that the
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 660 (1981) (overruling Philadelphia Fire) ("[Philadelphia Fire]
held that a corporation is not a 'person within the State's jurisdiction' ... for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause unless it is in compliance with the conditions placed upon its entry
into the State, and that a corporation assents to all state laws in effect at the time of its en-
try."); George F. Carpinello, State Protective Legislation and Nonresident Corporations: The
Privileges and Immunities Clause as a Treaty of Nondiscrimination, 73 IoWA L. REv. 351
(1988); David W. Hailer, Note, Within the State's Jurisdiction, 96 YALE L.J. 2110 (1987).
However, the Philadelphia Fire doctrine never reached more broadly than corporations. The
Court has always applied the Equal Protection Clause to discrimination against out-of-state
individuals. See, eg., Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494 (1926); Ferry v. Spokane
Ry., 258 U.S. 314 (1922); Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919); Kane v. New Jersey, 242
U.S. 160 (1916); Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910); Hammond Packing Co. v.
Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900); Central Loan and
Trust Co. v. Campbell Co., 173 U.S. 84 (1899); Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1896); see
also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403 (1948) ("Appellants maintain that by a parity of
reasoning the statute also contravenes the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. That may well be true, but we do not pass on this argument since it is unnecessary to
disposition of the present case."). In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), an alienage case, the
Court reviewed this case law and explicitly endorsed the narrow construction that the phrase
"within its jurisdiction" had always been given outside of the Philadelphia Fire context. See
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 214 (" '[w]ithin its jurisdiction' was intended in a broad sense to offer the
guarantee of equal protection to all within a State's boundaries, and to all upon whom the
State would impose the obligations of its laws."); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215 ("[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and
reaches into every corner of a State's territory.").
58. 461 U.S. 321 (1983). See supra note 23 (discussing Bynum).
59. 426 U.S. 794 (1976). See supra note 24 (discussing Alexandria Scrap).
60. Bynum, 461 U.S. at 328.
61. Id. at 328 n.7.
62. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 810.
rVol. 20:391
anti-protectionism side-constraint embodied in the dormant Commerce
Clause does not cover state spending. But Alexandria Scrap also explic-
itly decided that the out-of-state scrap processor "[could] claim Four-
teenth Amendment protection"63 and reached the merits of that claim.
There may well be a positive-rights exception to Article IV and the dor-
mant Commerce Clause, but there is no such exception to the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
In short, the Court has fluctuated in its willingness to enforce the
impartiality principle-Toomer and Southern Pacific did not appear until
the New Deal period" and have since been abandoned-but the Court
has consistently stated that noncitizens are covered by an impartiality
norm. The modem cases that fail to enforce this norm, such as Baldwin,
Bynum, and Alexandria Scrap, nonetheless articulate it, while Corfield,
which denies it, is a relic of the pre-Civil War period. 5 This, at least, is
63. IdL at 811 n.21.
64. In the Reconstruction era case of Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868), the Court in
dictum anticipated Toomer and read the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a broad imparti-
ality principle.
It was undoubtedly the object of the [privileges and immunities] clause... to
place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so
far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned. It
relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminat-
ing legislation against them by other States; ... it secures to them in other States the
equal protection of their laws. It has been justly said that no provision in the Consti-
tution has tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the United States one peo-
ple as this.
75 U.S. at 180 (citation omitted). This remarkable passage seemingly embodies the structural
argument offered in Part II. Paul supposes that "the citizens of the United States [are] one
people," and from that premise moves to a broad conception of the state legislator's obligation
to noncitizens. The legislator's powers must be used for their "advantage" as well as the citi-
zens': the well-being of outsiders takes equal weight ("the same footing"). However, subse-
quent Article IV cases from the pre-New Deal period generally took a Baldwin-like,
"fundamental" rights approach to Article IV. See TRIBE, supra note 44, at § 6-34; Baldwin,
436 U.S. at 397-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing this period).
Similarly, the "balancing" approach to the dormant Commerce Clause was a New Deal
innovation. See Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1
(1940). Prior to the New Deal, the Court basically understood the Commerce Clause as
prohibiting state protectionism and as allocating jurisdiction between Congress and the states.
See F. RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OVER COMMERCE (1937); John B. Sholley,
The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. Cm. L. REV. 556 (1936).
65. This picture of the case law, even if true, is not a perfect one for the anti-parochialist.
First, the cases involve discrimination against nonresidents, not facially neutral statutes that
adversely affect them. The Equal Protection Clause, as interpreted by the Court, may or may
not cover such statutes. Compare Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding a facially
race-neutral law will violate equal protection if motivated by a discriminatory purpose). Sec-
ond, it may or may not apply to every instance of residency discrimination. Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1981), gave a narrow reading to the limiting phrase "within its jurisdiction," but the
phrase was not reduced to a nullity. Rather, Plyler emphasized the notion of territorial juris-
diction. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 21215. If a state sends welfare checks to its own residents, but not
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my interpretation of the Supreme Court case law. Although the parochi-
alist also has a plausible interpretation, that reading is not clearly right.
State impartiality may be a counterintuitive position, but it is not a posi-
tion that the Court has been willing to reject, and it thus deserves the
serious and searching attention of constitutional scholars.
C. The Academic Literature
The topic of interstate equality has hardly escaped scholarly atten-
tion,66 but legal scholars have not yet furnished a thorough defense of
state impartiality,67 for several different reasons. First, much of the
to persons living outside the state, are those nonresidents "within the state's jurisdiction" for
Plyler purposes?
Perhaps the Equal Protection Clause cases can at best be interpreted as articulating the
principle that state legislators usually must refrain from unjustified discrimination against out-
of-staters. This is only an approximation to the general impartiality principle. On the other
hand, it is substantially broader than the principle proposed by the parochialist. Under the
parochialist model, there is no general prohibition on state discrimination, but simply specific
side-constraints on certain discriminatory courses of action, such as protectionism. Thus the
case law can be read to undermine the parochialist model, and to provide substantial if not
complete support for state impartiality. The parochialist cannot contend that the idea of state
impartiality lies outside the boundaries of well-socialized constitutional discourse, and that is
all I really mean to show in this section. My argument favoring state impartiality is the struc-
tural argument provided in part II, and my contention here is simply that this argument is
reasonably consistent with the case law.
66. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the "Inside-Outsider"
134 U. PA. L. REv. 1291 (1986); Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative
Intent, 78 MICH. L. Rnv. 392 (1980); Coenen, supra note 24; Cohen, supra note 23; Richard B.
Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. R.v. 43 (1988); Ely, supra
note 57; Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425
(1982); Gergen, supra note 24; Laycock, supra note 15; Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation
and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563 (1983); Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimi-
nation, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 261 (1987); Martin H.
Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of
Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569; James M. O'Fallon, The Commerce Clause: A Theoretical
Comment, 61 OR. L. Rv. 395 (1982); Regan, supra note 1; Robert A. Sedler, The Negative
Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of
Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. Rlv. 885 (1985); Simson, supra note 11; Symposium,
15 FLA. ST. U. L. Rv. 389 (1987); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 1979 Wisc. L. Rv. 125 (1979); Varat, supra note 23; Wildenthal, supra note 23;
Adam B. Schiff, Comment, State Discriminatory Action Against Nonresidents: Using the Origi-
nal Position Theory as a Framework for Analysis, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 583 (1985). This list
omits most of the vast literature on choice of law. See Laycock, supra note 15, at 252-256
(summarizing academic debate about parochialism in choice of law).
67. Neither have legal scholars provided a full-blown defense of state parochialism, so far
as I know. Donald Regan's well-known article, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism,
supra note 1, is not intended as a defense of state parochialism. Rather, Regan generally fo-
cuses on the federal courts and contends that the dormant Commerce Clause does not require
the courts to "balance" in-state against out-of-state interests. See also Redish & Nugent, supra
note 66 (arguing against judicial enforcement of dormant Commerce Clause). This contention
is consistent with my argument here. See infra text accompanying notes 84-85. Nonetheless,
scholarship is devoted to the problem of equal treatment, not the prob-
lem of impartiality. For example, Lea Brilmayer in an innovative article
shows how "one's rights and obligations [vis-a-vis the state] depend on
the nature of one's relationship to the state."' 68 Jonathan Varat's well-
known piece on State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality sets itself a
similar task: "to develop the substantive principles that should define the
proper scope of state authority to favor state residents in the distribution
of public resources."' 69 Yet this is only part of the problem of "interstate
equality," a term that Varat shares with Brilmayer. We need to consider
whether the state legislator should give equal weight to outsiders' inter-
ests absent some relevant distinction between in-staters and out-of-sta-
ters. We also need to identify those distinctions. Brilmayer, Varat, and
others have addressed the second issue, while I wish to focus on the first.
The first issue, albeit not ignored, has not been given the thorough
attention it deserves. Anti-parochialist legal scholars have not given suf-
ficient weight to the possibility that parochialism may be legitimate at the
level of the nation-state70 and thus have failed to show why state parochi-
alism is wrong. For example, in his well-known article, Choice of Law
and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, John Hart Ely impugned
"the premise, widely invoked in modem American choice-of-law theo-
Regan does at points articulate our intuition that state legislators should generally serve the
well-being of in-staters.
The [representation reinforcement] theory [of the dormant Commerce Clause]
assumes that out-of-state interests really ought to be represented - the theory as-
sumes it is a defect in our system that the system denies [out-of-staters] representa-
tion, as it is a defect if racial minorities or women are unrepresented or represented
ineffectively. But that assumption is not warranted. Nonrepresentation of [out-of-
state] interests follows from the simple fact that there are separate states; and the
existence of separate states, while it might be a defect in an ideal political system, can
hardly be treated as a defect in ours.
Regan, supra note 1, at 1164-65. See also Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982)
("While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective, the State has no legiti-
mate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders. Insofar as the Illinois law burdens out-
of-state transactions, there is nothing to be weighed in the balance to sustain the law.");
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980) ("The State's refusal to sell to buyers other
than South Dakotans is 'protectionist' only in the sense that it limits benefits generated by a
state program to those who fund the state treasury and whom the State was created to serve.").
Such comments confirm my sense that the parochialist model has intuitive plausibility, and
that a defense of state impartiality is not otiose.
68. Lea Brilmayer, Shaping and Sharing in Democratic Theory: Towards a Political Phi-
losophy of Interstate Equality, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 389, 413 (1987).
69. Varat, supra note 23, at 493.
70. The possible justifications for nation-state parochialism are briefly discussed infra text
following notes 90, 130. See generally CHARLES BErrz, INTERNATIONAL ETHIcs (1985);
STANLEY HOFFMANN, DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS: ON THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF
ETHICAL INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1981); Symposium on Duties Beyond Borders, 98 ETHICS
647 (1988).
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rizing, that a state has a greater interest in protecting its own citizens or
residents than it has in protecting others."'" Ely pointed to the Article
IV Privileges and Immunities Clause. "The guarantee of Article IV...
was plainly intended to prevent discrimination against out-of-staters: 'It
was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B
the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy.' ",72 He then ex-
plained that this anti-discrimination rule embodied a basic principle of
impartiality: "Discrimination against out-of-staters [was] singled out for
prohibition in the original constitutional document because [of]... the
unique political powerlessness of those with no voice in the local political
process."73 As Ely explained at somewhat greater length in his book,
Democracy and Distrust:
[T]he reason inequalities against nonresidents and not others were
singled out for prohibition . . . is obvious: nonresidents are a
paradigmatically powerless class politically. And their protection
proceeds by what amounts to a system of virtual representation:
by constitutionally tying the fate of outsiders to the fate of those
possessing political power, the framers insured that their interests
would be well looked after.74
But this argument is unconvincing. The Privileges and Immunities
Clause is not "plainly" a general anti-discrimination rule. The clause
does not use the words "discrimination" or "equality." It simply states
that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Its language leaves open
the Corfield interpretation: that the "Privileges and Immunities of Citi-
zens in the several States" denote a particular set of rights, both substan-
tive rights and equality rights. Under this reading, the out-of-stater is
"entitled" to those particular rights, but not to equal treatment or impar-
tiality more generally. At one extreme, if the United States were a con-
federation of independent nation-states, then Corfield's would be the
obvious reading. In that case, it would seem implausible that New
Yorkers have a general equality right against California, any more than
Australians have a general equality right against France.7 5
71. Ely, supra note 57, at 173.
72. Id at 181 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 395 (1948)).
73. Id at 189.
74. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw 83
(1980).
75. Lea Brilmayer has made precisely this point:
According to [the representation-reinforcement theory], the very exclusion of
resident aliens is the basis for an argument that they must be allowed to vote ....
This argument is curious, however, because it seems to justify inclusion on the basis
of exclusion. Furthermore, the argument could be made with regard to any group,
such as transient visitors who are presently denied the right to vote. The flaw in the
WHAT STATES OWE OUTSIDERS
Ely could have argued that legislators have a global duty of imparti-
ality, that aliens as well as out-of-staters have a right to "virtual represen-
tation." Conversely, he could have provided a theoretical argument why
the states are different from nation-states, and why out-of-staters should
be virtually represented even if aliens need not be. Instead, Ely relied
upon the history of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. "Article IV's
Privileges and Immunities Clause was intended.., to mean that state
legislatures cannot ... treat out-of-staters less favorably than they treat
locals."76 In neither his book nor his article, however, does Ely adduce
much specific evidence that the Framers actually intended the clause to
embody a broad principle of equal treatment or impartiality, and it is
hard to believe that such evidence exists. The precise nature of federal-
ism was a hotly debated question in 1787. 7 The Framers agreed that the
states were located somewhere on the spectrum between administrative
subdivision and sovereign nation-state, but they strongly disagreed about
the precise location. It is therefore implausible that the Framers shared a
common view of state parochialism. Unless you believe in global impar-
tiality, your view of state parochialism depends on your conception of
federalism. 78
reasoning that leads to such paradoxical results is the premise that political exclusion
is always a process defect.
Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts and the Fate of the "Inside-Outsider", supra note 66, at 1325.
76. ELY, supra note 74, at 83.
77. See sources cited infira note 89.
78. Compare Gergen, supra note 24, at 1118-1128 (reviewing history of Article IV at
length and concluding that "the Framers sought ... only to ensure outsiders the right to
engage in trade and commerce free from discriminatory tax or regulatory burdens") with
David S. Bogen, The Privileges and Immunities Clause ofArticle IV, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
794 (1987) (reviewing history of Article IV at length and concluding that the Framers in-
tended a broad interstate equality principle).
In my view, the most interesting fact that emerges from these histories is: the precursors
to the Privileges and Immunities Clause were considerably longer and more specific than the
clause itself. For example, Article IV of the Articles of Confederation provided:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among
the people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these
states ... shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the
several states; and the people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and
from any other state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce,
subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof
respectively, provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the
removal of property imported into any state, to any other state, of which the owner is
an inhabitant ....
U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV. One inference from the relative brevity of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause is that "familiar principles... were widely understood to
inform the clause." Simson, supra note 11, at 384. Another view, inspired by public choice
theory, is that the Framers promulgated a brief, ambiguous provision because they could not
agree on a longer, more specific one.
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In short, I believe that an historical or narrowly textual approach to
constitutional interpretation will not work here.79 The language and his-
tory of the Privileges and Immunities Clause will not tell us whether the
Constitution creates a broad interstate equality principle because its lan-
guage is ambiguous and its drafters did not share a single, common in-
tent. Rather than focusing on the Clause or on some other short segment
of constitutional text, I will employ the "structural" method exemplified
by Regan's article on The Supreme Court and State Protectionism. Re-
gan asked the reader to "imagine that she is drafting a constitution for
the United States in the economic and social conditions of [the pres-
ent].""0 This imaginative, theoretical exercise at first may not seem a
valid method for interpreting the Constitution, however, upon closer in-
spection, it certainly is. The Constitution stipulates, ambiguously, that
"[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immu-
nities of Citizens in the several States" 81; and that "[no State shall] deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."82
Each of these short segments of text can be read as a general principle of
impartiality. One way to evaluate this reading, as against competing in-
terpretations, is to ask whether the reading is theoretically consistent
with the rest of the Constitution as amended. 3 The imaginative exercise
proposed by Regan merely provides a vivid answer to this question.
One final point. The scholarly literature on interstate equality, like
much legal writing, is focused on the federal courts.8 4 Scholars have
79. Other prominent advocates of interstate equality besides Ely have also taken a histori-
cal approach. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 15, at 262-66; Simson, supra note 11, at 383-86;
Varat, supra note 23, at 489, 518 (Article IV "explicitly prohibit[s] state discrimination against
the citizens of other states"; "[t]he Framers adopted the constitutional ban on state discrimina-
tion against nonresidents ... primarily as an instrument of national unification").
80. Regan, supra note 1, at 1110.
81. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.1.
82. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
83. See generally CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONsTrrU-
TIONAL LAW (1965) (advocating and illustrating the structural approach). The caveat "as
amended" is quite important. The best reading of the Constitution will synthesize all its provi-
sions, including amendments. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 131-62
(1991). In particular, the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause may have been
changed by the post-Civil War and post-New Deal changes to the federal structure. See ACK-
ERMAN, supra, at 58-80, 105-30 (contending that Civil War and New Deal involved constitu-
tional "regime" shifts); see also infra text accompanying notes 123-25.
84. For that reason, legal scholars have almost completely ignored the Equal Protection
Clause as a locus for interstate equality principles, even though this provision uses the word
"equal" while Article IV and the Commerce Clause do not. See Ely, supra note 57, at 180-81
("The clause that thrusts itself forward [as precluding parochialism], of course, is that first
resort of constitutional argument, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Limiting the protection of local laws to local people is obviously 'rational' under traditional
tests, but somehow that seems unsatisfying. Classifications that distinguish locals from out-of-
sought to guide judges in resolving out-of-stater cases, and the jus-
ticiability of a particular interstate norm has often been taken as a reason
in favor or against the norm. But it is perfectly plausible to assert that
state impartiality is a constitutional norm unenforced by the federal
courts.
[C]onstitutional norms which are underenforced by the federal ju-
diciary should be understood to be legally valid to their full con-
ceptual limits, and federal judicial decisions which stop short of
these limits should be understood as delineating only the bounda-
ries of the federal courts' role in enforcing the norm. By 'legally
valid,' I mean that the unenforced margins of underenforced
norms should have the full status of positive law which we gener-
ally accord to the norms of our Constitution, save only that the
federal judiciary will not enforce these margins."
"Does the Constitution require state impartiality?" is the question that
ought to be analyzed first, independently from the question "Should the
federal courts enforce this requirement?" Legislators as well as executive
officers and citizens are bound by constitutional norms, even nonjusticia-
ble norms; and conscientious legislators will want to know what these
norms entail. In this Article, for the sake of brevity and clarity, I ignore
the problem of judicial enforcement and merely try to show that an im-
partiality principle exists.
II. The Structural Argument
Imagine that the Framer is defining the state legislator's basic point
of view. There are two plausible alternatives: either the legislator should
generally serve the interests of in-staters, absent some federal constraint
(the parochialist model); or the legislator should generally serve the in-
terests of all U.S. citizens (the impartiality model).86 The choice between
staters seem... suspect.... Since the special constitutional vulnerability of such distinctions
is established quite directly by Article IV .... it is this clause that I shall proceed to con-
sider."); Eule, supra note 66, at 454 (advancing same view).
85. Sager, supra note 46, at 12-21.
86. It might be objected that there is a third model, where the legislator is authorized but
not required to consider out-of-state interests absent a side-constraint. However, this is not
really an independent model of the legislator's point of view because it does not define the
group of people whose well-being the legislator should serve. To say that the legislator is
permitted but not required to consider out-of-state interests does not explain how the legislator
decides whether to exercise this permission. Presumably the legislator makes that decision by
considering the well-being of all U.S. citizens (in which case the permission must be exercised)
or by considering only the well-being of in-state citizens (in which case the permission cannot
be exercised). Ultimately, the legislator's "constituency" is still either in-staters or the entire
U.S. citizenry.
There is a sense in which the legislator is "authorized but not required" to consider out-
of-state interests under the impartiality model. If the state electorate demands that the legisla-
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the two models is informed by relevant features of the Constitution, such
as the fact that states are political communities and that a national Con-
gress has certain powers. Which option would the Framer choose? 7
Let me make this imaginative exercise a little more precise. The
Constitution should not be conceptualized as a "treaty" between the sev-
eral States. It should not be supposed that the Peoples of the States sent
representatives to the constitutional convention, where each representa-
tive took a parochial point of view and bargained with the others. In-
stead, the proper conception is that the Constitution was created by the
People of the United States. 8 Rather than bargaining, the participants
in the convention ought to have engaged in reasoned deliberation. They
tor ignore outsiders, then the legislator has a good, impartial reason for doing so. See infra
text accompanying notes 108-12. Thus, in a sense, that legislator is authorized to consider out-
of-state interests (if the electorate so allows) but not required to do so (if the electorate
doesn't). However, I think it is more precise to describe this legislator as being required to give
equal weight to out-of-state interests, ceterisparibus, at some level of generality, with the legis-
lator's democratic obligation to the state electorate as a factor that may justify zero weight for
out-of-state interests. This formulation explains why the legislator would exercise an authori-
zation to give weight to out-of-state interests, while the "authorized but not required" formula-
tion does not.
87. I am assuming that Constitution does indeed define the legislator's basic point of view.
This is a crucial assumption, but also a legitimate one. As Douglas Laycock has explained in a
related context:
[Clhoice of law within the United States is inherently constitutional law.
Choice-of-law questions are about the allocation of authority among the several
states. Allocation of authority is what constitutions do.... It would be an astonish-
ing oversight if our fundamental law did not state general principles allocating au-
thority among states ....
Laycock, supra note 15, at 250 (citations omitted). Similarly, it would be an "astonishing
oversight" if the Constitution did not decide whether state legislators should generally advance
the well-being of state citizens or of all U.S. citizens. Point of view, like authority, is a defining
feature of the state legislator's office and goes to the very nature of our federal system. The
very first question that conscientious legislators must ask is: "Whose interests do I serve?"
Moreover, the Constitution has various provisions (the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) that arguably address
this very question. The best reading of these provisions is that they do address it. If the
Constitution speaks to the authority of the states, see U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10; U.S. CONST.
amend. X; and to the formation of states, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3; and to the form of state
government, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; and to state citizenship, see U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1; then it also speaks to the state legislator's point of view.
If I am wrong, and the Constitution simply leaves open the legitimacy of state parochial-
ism, then the case for impartiality becomes much more difficult. That case, then, is no differ-
ent from the case against nation-state parochialism. If the Constitution does not define the
state legislator's point of view as between in-staters and out-of-staters, then state law does,
absent a federal statute or perhaps federal common law. And proving that state law requires
an impartial point of view from state legislators is like proving that nation-state law requires an
impartial point of view from nation-state legislators.
88. See generally AcKcRmAN, supra note 83, at 165-99; Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty
and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1429-66 (1987).
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ought to have drafted the document from a common, national point of
view. That point of view is at least impartial between United States citi-
zens, just as the state legislator's point of view is at least impartial be-
tween state citizens. In other words, the Framers of the Constitution
ought to have given equal weight to the well being of all U.S. citizens,
ceteris paribus, at some level of generality.
This conception of the Constitution, as the product of rational delib-
eration from a point of view impartial between U.S. citizens, may well
have been controversial in 1787 or in 1850,89 but it is hardly controver-
sial now. At a minimum it is hardly controversial that the People of the
United States create the Constitution, and that their agents (the Framers)
should deliberate in a reasoned manner. That the Framers should take a
point of view impartial between U.S. citizens is less of a commonplace,
but this premise readily flows from the first two. If the Framers are en-
gaged in reasoned deliberation, as they should be, then they need to take
a common point of view. Moreover, that point of view should be appro-
priate to their role as agents for the People of the United States, for the
national political community. Thus, the Framers should be at least im-
partial between all members of that community.9"
This principle distinguishes the problem of state parochialism from
the problem of nation-state parochialism. The state citizen and the out-
of-stater are both U.S. citizens. They are both members of the national
political community, and it is the agents of that community who create
the Constitution. A proponent of state parochialism must show why
Framers impartial between all U.S. citizens would choose the parochial-
ist model over the model of state impartiality. By contrast, the propo-
nent of nation-state parochialism need not contend with a world political
community, and show that the Framers of the World Constitution, im-
partial between all members of the World, would establish a system of
nation-state parochialism. It can be supposed that the nation-state is pa-
89. See ELIZABETH BAUER, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, 1790-1860 (1965);
WALTER HARTWELL BENNETT, AMERICAN THEORIES OF FEDERALISM (1964); DON E.
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLI-
TICS (1978); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATES: ANTIFEDERALISM
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1964).
90. Modem constitutional theory almost always proceeds from this conception of the
Constitution. The conception is implicit in any attempt to justify some putative feature of the
Constitution. Modem theorists almost never advance an argument of this form: "the Consti-
tution should be understood to mean X because X would have resulted from bargaining be-
tween the delegates from the various states." Rather, the theorist usually puts forward some
normative argument, which implicitly takes account of the well-being of all U.S. citizens, if not
all persons. In doing so, the theorist makes the assumption that the Framers themselves
should have engaged in this kind of normative reasoning. Otherwise, why would it be helpful
in analyzing the Constitution?
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rochial all the way down: that the framers of the nation-state constitution
will ignore aliens' interests, and that these parochial framers will instruct
the nation-state legislator to ignore aliens as well.
On the other hand, the fact that the U.S. Constitution is drafted by
Framers who are impartial between all U.S. citizens does not automati-
cally preclude state parochialism. Those Framers did not create a uni-
tary national government. There are good, impartial reasons for
federalism. The existence of states arguably enhances the well being of
all U.S. citizens.9' State parochialism might also do so.
Why would an impartial Framer choose the parochialist model over
the model of state impartiality? Why would that Framer instruct the
state legislator to ignore out-of-state interests with respect to a particular
set of legislative decisions, specifically those decisions not covered by fed-
eral side constraints? Two conditions must be met for an impartial
Framer to adopt the parochialist model. First, the Framer must believe
that out-of-state interests are not ultimately determinative to those deci-
sions. As I've already suggested, that belief is thoroughly plausible. In
Parts II.A and II.B below, I will more fully canvass the various explana-
tions why out-of-state interests might not determine particular decisions
by the state legislator. One explanation is that Congress takes care of
interstate problems. Another is that the state legislator's role - as the
elected representative of the state citizenry, or as a member of the thick
state community - requires the legislator to give little or no weight to
out-of-state interests. A third is that out-of-state interests do not bear
upon the decision, independent of the legislator's role.
But the Framer must believe more. There needs to be some reason
why various propositions of the form "out-of-state interests are irrelevant
to these decisions" should be written into the Constitution. Under the
model of state impartiality, state legislators decide for themselves, in any
given case, either that they are democratically obliged to give zero weight
to out-of-state interests, or that out-of-staters have no legitimate interest,
or that Congress has already satisfied out-of-staters, and so forth. Under
this model, the Constitution itself never instructs the legislator that the
only determinative interests are indeed in-state. And why should the
Constitution contain such an instruction? Without a good answer to this
91. See generally AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, FEDERAL-
ISM (1991) (review of federalism literature); THOMAS J. ANTON, AMERICAN FEDERALISM
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1989) (same); DAVID C. NICE, FEDERALISM: THE POLITICS OF INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (1987) (same); POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCI-
PLINE (Ada W. Finifter ed., 1983) (same).
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question, the Framer would choose the model of state impartiality over
the model of state parochialism.
A standard explanation why certain principles belong in the Consti-
tution is that "normal politics"92 is insufficiently deliberative. Because
the legislative process is normally driven by the narrow desires of the
electoral majority, because the legislators and their constituents do not
normally deliberate about the public good, the process cannot be trusted
to honor those principles, or so the story goes.93 But this appeal to the
reality of "normal politics" is not open to the proponent of state parochi-
alism. If state legislators go about their task in the "normal" fashion,
merely seeking without more to serve the interests of the electorate, then
the legislators will ignore out-of-staters. The expected "normality" of
state politics is not a good reason for the Framer to constitutionalize the
principle "out-of-state interests are not determinative to these decisions."
Rather, the proponent of state parochialism must offer this kind of
story: "If the Constitution requires impartiality with respect to a partic-
ular decision, the legislators who obey this duty will reach the wrong
outcome. They will wrongly give substantial weight to out-of-state inter-
ests, even though such interests are irrelevant." The parochialist must
show why conscientious legislators, who would obey the duty of imparti-
ality, are in this case unfit to assess the relative weight of in-state and out-
of-state interests. 94
92. On the distinction between "normal" and "constitutional" politics, see ACKERMAN,
supra note 83.
93. This story explains why the Constitution guarantees certain rights for out-of-staters.
A "normal" state politician will naturally serve insiders' interests at the expense of outsiders',
because the insiders elect the legislator.
94. I mean "unfit" quite broadly. The parochialist must have some reason for allocating
the decision to ignore outsiders' interests to the Framer rather than the state legislator. The
reason could be that the legislator is a less accurate decisionmaker than the Framer. Or per-
haps the two are equally accurate, but it is cheaper for the Framer to make a once-and-for-all
decision than for the legislator to evaluate outsiders' interests on a case-by-case basis. Cf
Colin Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 66-79 (1983)
(discussing allocation of decisions between rulemaker and subsequent adjudicator).
My argument here bears a family resemblance to John Hart Ely's "representation rein-
forcement" theory of constitutional law. Ely argues that the Constitution only protects those
groups whose interests are not adequately represented in the political process. See ELY, supra
note 74. Similarly, I am suggesting that the Constitution only addresses those issues that the
political process is unfit to resolve. This criterion is importantly different from Ely's. For
example, Ely would immediately deny that the Constitution protects in-staters against out-of-
staters (because in-staters are the represented class), while I believe that this outcome is theo-
retically possible, if conscientious state legislators are somehow unfit to evaluate out-of-staters'
interests. However, I certainly agree with Ely that the proponent of a constitutional principle
must defend its removal from the political process.
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The constitutional status of state parochialism involves the alloca-
tion of authority between the Framer and the state legislator. Giving
zero weight to out-of-state interests may be morally legitimate in certain
cases, but the question remains: Who decides, the Framer or the legisla-
tor? The parochialist lacks a convincing answer to this question.
A. The Paradigm Case: Distributing the State Fise
Consider the case of positive rights. As I've already discussed, there
is no side-constraint that obliges the state legislator to share the state fisc
with out-of-staters. The anti-expropriation side-constraint in Complete
Auto Transit gives out-of-staters a substantive right to the monies that
they have contributed, but the remaining portion of the state fisc can be
spent for the sole benefit of in-staters. In other words, the Constitution
does not require the state legislator to redistribute resources from in-sta-
ters to out-of-staters. The out-of-stater has no right at all-not a right to
equal treatment, and surely not a substantive right-to resources that
derived from state citizens.95
The exclusion of outsiders from the state fisc is a core instance of
their differential treatment. Legal scholars, however egalitarian, gener-
ally concede that out-of-staters need not receive welfare payments and
similar state subsidies.96 Thus state spending should also be a core in-
stance of state parochialism. If the Constitution instructs the legislator
to ignore out-of-staters, such instruction should at least cover the state
fisc. But it does not. The parochialist can provide various reasons why
out-of-state interests are not determinative to the state's fiscal decision,
97
but the parochialist cannot explain why the impartial state legislator
would be incompetent to assess these reasons himself.
The simplest explanation why out-of-state interests do not deter-
mine fiscal decisions is this: out-of-staters have no legitimate interest in
such decisions.9" Out-of-staters have no claim to the in-stater's re-
sources, because any redistributive claim is internal to the state political
community. Perhaps the exclusion of noncontributing in-staters stigma-
tizes them as incomplete citizens and thereby hinders their full participa-
95. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
96. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 24, at 1112-16; Laycock, supra note 15, at 271-73; Sim-
son, supra note 11, at 397-98; Varat, supra note 23, at 522-23.
97. "Fiscal decision" is my shorthand for the state legislator's decision how to spend the
portion of the state fisc that in-staters have contributed.
98. This is the paradigmatic "role-independent" reason for the legislator to give zero
weight to out-of-state interests. See infra text accompanying notes 126-31.
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tion in state politics.9 9 Perhaps noncontributing in-staters are members
of the same thick community as contributing in-staters, and therefore
have some communitarian claim to the contributors' resources.1c° Per-
haps the contributors actually want to share with the in-state noncon-
tributors, who are their friends and neighbors. But there is no such
reason for redistributing resources from in-staters to out-of-staters, or so
the parochialist could assert.
Why, though, should the Framer decide whether out-of-staters have
a redistributive claim against in-staters? Why aren't conscientious state
legislators perfectly qualified to do so themselves? The question, here, is
not whether out-of-staters really have a redistributive claim against in-
staters, but whether the rule "out-of-staters have no redistributive claim
against in-staters" should be written into the Constitution.
Indeed, it is quite clear that the Constitution does not contain this
rule. If it did, then Congress's power to redistribute resources from one
state to another would be inexplicable. Whatever constraints the Uni-
99. I think that this idea explains the "durational residency" cases, beginning with Sha-
piro v. Thompson, where the Court required states to include new residents in various benefits
programs. See Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (civil ser-
vice employment); Hooper v. Bernalillo County, 472 U.S. 612 (1985) (tax exemption); Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (distribution of state surplus); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (medical care); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (wel-
fare)). See generally Cohen, supra note 23; Wildenthal, supra note 23.
The first two cases in this series, Shapiro and Memorial Hospital, relied upon the right of
interstate travel, and Soto-Lopez has revived the right-of-travel argument. But durational resi-
dency requirements need not directly "burden" travel: imagine that a New Yorker receives
$100 per month in welfare payments, and would receive $250 as a new resident of California,
where established residents get $300. Conversely, the Californian's right to travel to New
York is "burdened" by an expected $200 loss in welfare payments, a loss that would occur
even if New York treats the Californian as well as established New Yorkers. As the Court
admitted in Zobel: "[R]ight to travel analysis refers to little more than a particular application
of equal protection analysis. Right to travel cases have examined, in equal protection terms,
state distinctions between newcomers and longer term residents." 457 U.S. at 60 n.6.
A better explanation for these cases is that the Constitution requires new residents to be
full citizens of the state. See, eg., Zobel, 457 U.S. at 69 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[lit is
significant that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly equates citi-
zenship only with simple residence. That Clause does not provide for, and does not allow for,
degrees of citizenship based on length of residence.") (footnote omitted). And state discrimi-
nation against new residents stigmatizes them as incomplete citizens. See, e.g., Hooper, 472
U.S. at 623 ("The New Mexico statute creates two tiers of resident Vietnam veterans, identify-
ing resident veterans who settled in the State after [a particular date], as in a sense 'second-
class citizens.' "). The right to travel referred to by the Court in Shapiro and Memorial Hospi-
tal is better understood as a right to change your state citizenship, and durational residency
requirements penalize that right indirectly, by creating a stigma that could deter out-of-staters
from becoming new citizens.
100. See supra note 18. WALZER, supra note 18, at 3-30, epitomizes the view that distribu-
tive justice is internal to "thick" communities.
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formity or Apportionment Clauses might once have imposed,101 it is now
absolutely clear that national taxes and expenditures need not be geo-
graphically neutral.1 1 2 Congress has the authority to impose progressive
national taxes, or to establish progressive spending programs, and
thereby to transfer resources from richer states to poorer. The premise
behind this kind of transfer is that the poor citizens of the net transferee
state do have redistributive claims on the rich citizens of the net trans-
feror state. To be sure, Congress is not required to recognize interstate
redistributive claims, and neither is the state legislator, but the Constitu-
tion does not rule out the existence of such claims. This supposed expla-
nation for why the state legislator can take a parochial point of view in
distributing the state fisc-that out-of-staters have no legitimate interest
in the fiscal decision--does not work.
The parochialist's next explanation is that Congress should do the
work of interstate redistribution. The parochialist must concede that the
Constitution does not rule out interstate redistributive claims, but can
argue that the Constitution gives Congress the task of evaluating and
satisfying these claims. Indeed, this is precisely the argument advanced
by "fiscal federalism," perhaps the most prominent federalism theory in
the political science literature.103 Under the fiscal federalism theory,
Congress uses taxes, block grants, and other fiscal mechanisms to ensure
that each state's fise is the "correct" size as required by corrective and
distributive justice. If New Yorkers have made a net contribution of X
dollars to the California fisc, and have a net redistributive claim of Y
101. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1 ("[A]U Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States .... "); U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 ("No Capitation, or other
direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before
directed to be taken."). See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (hold-
ing income tax unconstitutional as non-apportioned "direct" tax, and also discussing uniform-
ity problem).
102. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 n.2 (1987) ("The level of deference to the
congressional decision is such that the Court has more recently questioned whether 'general
welfare' is a judicially enforceable restriction at all.") (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
9091 (1976) (per curiam)); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding federal old-age
benefits, as provided by Social Security Act; Congress may deploy spending power in aid of the
general welfare, to solve problems of national scope); see also U.S. CONST. amend XVI (federal
income tax need not be apportioned among states); United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74
(1983) (Uniformity Clause does not bar geographically specific tax, where justified by national
purpose). See generally TRIBE, supra note 44, at §§ 5-9 to 5-10.
103. See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM (1972); WALLACE E. OATES, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL FEDERALISM (1977); PAUL E. PETERSON & KENNETH K.
WONG, WHEN FEDERALISM WORKS (1986); HARVEY S. ROSEN, FISCAL FEDERALISM:
QUANTITATIVE STUDIES (1988); Edward M. Gramlich, Reforming U.S. Federal Fiscal Ar-
rangements, in AMERICAN DOMESTIC PIoRITIES 34 (John M. Quigley & Daniel L.
Rubenfeld eds., 1985).
dollars on Californians, then Congress should transfer X + Y dollars
from California to New York. The California legislator need not arrange
any additional transfer, but rather should use the California fisc for the
sole benefit of Californians-or so the theory goes.
There are a number of crucial flaws in this theory. First, Congress
will likely fail to arrange the appropriate transfer. After all, Members of
Congress are often parochial. California's Senators and Representatives
may ignore New York interests and succeed in blocking the fiscal pro-
grams that an impartial Congress would have agreed upon. Moreover,
the appropriate transfer depends on factors specific to New York and
California, inter alia the incidence of New York and California taxes and
the relative neediness of New Yorkers and Californians. The nationwide
spending, taxing, and block grant programs enacted by an impartial Con-
gress will not fully reflect these factors, just as a nationwide health or
education statute would not be finely tuned to local needs.'I
Second, even if an impartial Congress somehow succeeds in arrang-
ing an appropriate transfer by its own lights, there will still be room for
independent action by California. Imagine that the citizens of California
and the citizens of New York disagree with the rest of the country about
certain issues of distributive justice. Californians and New Yorkers gen-
erally acknowledge a certain kind of redistributive claim, for example,
"able-bodied, impoverished persons without children deserve welfare
benefits," while U.S. citizens generally do not. Thus, California and New
York each engage in internal redistribution, setting up "general assist-
ance" programs for impoverished, able-bodied, childless persons. But
Congress does not help fund these programs because the U.S. citizenry
believes that the beneficiaries are shirkers. Imagine now that New York
runs into budget problems and is on the brink of cancelling its program.
Should California provide a "horizontal block grant" to New York? The
answer may be no, but the reason for a negative answer cannot be the
fiscal federalist's. It cannot be that Congress has taken care of interstate
redistribution.
Any transfer between New York and California should take account
of redistributive norms that New York and California recognize, even if
the rest of the United States does not. This is a simple extension of the
idea that California's internal redistribution programs should take ac-
count of redistributive norms that Californians recognize, even if other
U.S. citizens do not, which in turn is an application of the basic principle
104. The idea that state statutes more accurately reflect "local factors"-legislative facts
that vary from state to state-is a classic justification for federalism. See sources cited supra
note 91.
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that decentralization enhances democratic responsiveness: ceteris paribus
governmental action in state X should reflect state X norms rather than
national norms.10 5 Nor is it unusual for this principle to be extended to
the two-state or multi-state case: ceteris paribus governmental action as
between states X, Y and Z should reflect the common norms of X, Y and
Z rather than national norms. This is a familiar feature of choice of law.
If two states share a particular version of tort law, T1, while the remain-
ing states have T2, T1 may well govern a tort suit between the citizens of
those two states.10 6 T, is more likely than T2 to reflect the judgments and
beliefs of the affected parties.
In short, the Framer would not direct the state legislator to ignore
out-of-staters' redistributive claims, simply because Congress has the au-
thority to address those claims. The fact that Congress can and will pro-
mulgate certain redistributive programs does not mean that Congress
will "solve the problem" of interstate redistribution and leave no room
for supplemental action by the state legislator. 10 7
The next possibility is that the state legislators' role as "representa-
tives," their democratic obligation to the state electorate, precludes them
from redistributing resources to out-of-staters. Indeed, state legislators
105. Again, this is a classic justification for federalism: state statutes will more accurately
reflect "local values," normative views that are held by the citizens of some states but not by
the citizens of every state. See sources cited supra note 91.
106. For example, Vermont's guest statute may be applied to preclude suit by a Vermont
passenger against a Vermont driver for a car accident in Alabama, even though Alabama has
no guest statute. See Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120 (1965); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d
473 (1963).
What if California recognizes a particular distributive norm while New York does not?
Should California nonetheless transfer resources to New York pursuant to that norm? This is
a conflict-of-laws problem. It is a difficult question whether California or New York tort law
should govern the interaction between Californians and New Yorkers if the two tort laws are
different. Similarly, it is a difficult question whether California's or New York's distributive
norm should govern the allocation of resources between Californians and New Yorkers if the
two states recognize different distributive norms. I do not have an answer to these questions.
The example in the text illustrates a much easier case-where two states recognize the same
norm. This is analogous to the no-conflicts case in torts, where a New Yorker sues a Califor-
nian for a tort in California or New York, and California and New York have the same version
of tort law.
107. This point can be rephrased in terms of preemption doctrine. As a general matter,
congressional action on a particular subject does not preempt state action. See generally Paul
Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69 (1988);
Comment, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L.
REV. 208 (1959); Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978). For
example, both Congress and the states have regulated pollution and criminalized drug offenses.
Similarly, both Congress and the states can redistribute resources interstate. To be sure, Con-
gressional redistribution may preempt particular kinds of state redistribution in particular
cases. But state redistribution is not universally preempted, which is what the parochialist
proposes.
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may well have a democratic obligation to eschew redistribution, even
where out-of-staters have valid redistributive claims that Congress has
failed to satisfy. For the impartial legislator, such obligation may consti-
tute a valid reason to attribute zero weight to outsiders' interests. But
legislators must themselves decide that democracy precludes redistribu-
tion. That possibility does not justify the Framers in choosing the model
of state parochialism over the model of impartiality.
The state legislator's democratic obligation is a general concept,
which admits of different conceptions.108 One kind of conception (call it
"non-pluralist") permits the legislator to deviate from the electorate's in-
terests. Under a "non-pluralist" conception, the legislator is obliged in
some measure to do what the electorate would approve.109 And the vot-
ers might approve an outcome that misserves their own tangible inter-
ests-such as the redistribution of resources out-of-state. The voters
might themselves take an impartial point of view.
By contrast, under a "pluralist" conception, the legislator has a
democratic obligation to advance the electorate's interests, even if the
electorate would choose a different course.110 The pluralist conception
necessarily precludes redistribution by the state legislator, because redis-
tribution serves outsiders at the expense of in-staters. The non-pluralist
conception does so only contingently, depending on whether the electo-
rate would disapprove.
If the Framers adopt a non-pluralist conception of the democratic
obligation, they do not yet have a good reason to require fiscal parochial-
ism. The Constitution, then, simply contains some form of the rule "the
state legislator should elicit the state electorate's approval." Hypotheti-
cally, the Framer could also predict that the state electorate would not
approve redistribution and for that reason require parochialism, but this
hypothesis is wholly implausible. It is the state legislator, and not the
Framer, who is best suited to decide what the state electorate would
108. See generally JAMES ROLAND PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY (1979)
(discussing various conceptions of democracy); JAMES ROLAND PENNOCK AND JOHN WIL-
LIAM CHAPMAN, PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS (1975) (same).
109. Perhaps the legislator is required to do what a majority of voters would approve if
they were fully rational and informed-or perhaps what the majority actually approves if they
do so with sufficient intensity.
110. Cass Sunstein has discussed and criticized pluralism at length. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and
the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984).
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approve. I11
By contrast, if the Constitution enacts a pluralist conception of de-
mocracy, then the Constitution also requires state parochialism. If plu-
ralism holds true, then the state legislator should ignore out-of-staters'
interests, even if in-staters themselves disapprove that course of action.
But this is surely paradoxical. Where the electorate itself takes an impar-
tial point of view, why is it more "democratic" for the legislator to ignore
outsiders? In such a case, parochialism is surely anti-democratic.
Moreover, pluralism is much too blunt a weapon for the parochial-
ist. Pluralism not only precludes interstate redistribution by the state
legislator, but also intrastate redistribution by the legislator and inter-
state redistribution by Congress. More specifically, it precludes intra-
state redistribution from a majority of voters to a minority and interstate
redistribution by Congress from a majority of states to a minority. A
state welfare program, which benefits the poor minority of state citizens,
may well misserve the narrowly defined interests of the rich majority;
therefore, a pluralist state legislator would be obliged to reject this pro-
gram, even if the rich majority recognized that the program was morally
obligatory. Similarly, a pluralist Member of Congress would be obliged
to vote against a national redistributive program such as AFDC or food
stamps if that program caused a net transfer of resources away from the
Member's state." 2 Thus, if a majority of states are net transferrors-if
the program's beneficiaries are concentrated in a few poor states-a Con-
gress of pluralist Senators and Representatives could not approve it. A
pluralist conception of the democratic obligation would preclude Con-
gress from playing the impartial redistributive role that the "fiscal feder-
alism" theory presupposes.
For similar reasons, the parochialist cannot argue that the legisla-
tor's communitarian obligation, as the member of a thick community, 13
111. The same analysis holds true if the Framer does not choose between pluralist and non-
pluralist conceptions, but leaves this choice to the state legislator.
The state legislator's relative competence in deciding what the state electorate would ap-
prove also explains the Complete Auto Transit v. Brady rule, barring redistribution by state A
from a state B citizen to a state A citizen. See supra text accompanying note 26. The state B
legislator, and not the state A legislator, is best suited to decide whether state B citizens would
approve this decision, which harms them. By contrast, a reverse-Complete Auto Transit rule-
precluding redistribution by state A from a state A citizen to a state B citizen-would be silly,
because the state A legislator is best suited to decide what state A citizens would approve. And
if state B citizens do not want the extra resources, they can send the resources back.
112. The Member of Congress, like the state legislator, owes a democratic obligation to the
state electorate. Although there might be some reason why the Constitution would instruct
state legislators but not Members of Congress to serve the narrow self-interest of their elector-
ates, I cannot imagine what that reason could be.
113. See supra note 19.
would lead the Framer to require fiscal parochialism. Assume that the
fellow members of a thick community owe each other a duty of loyalty as
do friends or relatives. Assume, too, that the state is a thick community.
When state legislators redistribute resources from in-staters to out-of-sta-
ters, are the legislators thereby disloyal to their fellow citizens? This de-
pends on the conception of "loyalty." State legislators may decide,
themselves, that "loyalty" or some other communitarian obligation pre-
cludes interstate redistribution. But surely the Constitution does not dic-
tate that the states must be thick communities, let alone that the states
must adopt a narrowly self-interested conception of the communitarian
obligation.
In short, the out-of-stater may well have redistributive claims
against in-staters, claims that Congress may not have satisfied and that
democratic and communitarian norms permit the legislator to recognize.
But there is still the possibility that the dynamics of the multi-state sys-
tem preclude redistribution by the state legislator. This possibility is reg-
ularly discussed by legal scholars and political scientists.' 14 Where one
state adopts a generous interstate policy, other decisionmakers may react
in a selfish fashion with untoward results. For example, if a state were to
include out-of-staters in its welfare programs, other states would "free
ride" on this generous policy by reducing their own programs. Selfish in-
staters would try to reduce their tax burdens by migrating to the less
generous states. And selfish out-of-staters would try to collect welfare
benefits in more than one state.
But what legal scholars have failed to notice is that the impartial
legislator can take account of "free rider" effects, migration effects, and
other dynamic effects caused by the multi-state system. The impartial
legislator can deliberate as follows: "Out-of-staters have a prima facie
redistributive claim, but redistribution will harm other persons' legiti-
mate interests, because selfish citizens will emigrate, selfish outsiders will
claim double benefits, and parochial states will reduce their own pro-
grams. Therefore, on balance, I decide against redistribution." Dynamic
effects are simply another potentially relevant factor for the impartial
legislator. 115
114. See Gergen, supra note 24, at 1112; Laycock, supra note 15, at 271-73; Varat, supra
note 23, at 522-23; sources cited supra note 103 (fiscal federalism literature).
115. Cf. Western & So. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981)
(upholding "retaliatory tax" by California on out-of-state insurance companies, imposed where
company's home state taxes California insurance companies at higher rate than California
would otherwise tax out-of-state companies) (Court affirms that state A can consider and seek
to influence state B policies in treating out-of-stater from state B).
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Nor is the Framer better suited to evaluate this factor. The decision
that dynamic effects "trump" the out-of-stater's redistributive claim is
contingent on normative and empirical premises. The empirical premise
is that states and citizens will, in fact, react to redistribution in a certain
way. The normative premise is that the legitimate interests harmed by
this reaction are weightier than the out-of-stater's redistributive claim.
Whether these premises hold true is a policy decision, a decision left to
the legislator by the Constitution. The parochialist has no good explana-
tion why the Framer should bother calculating migration effects, free
rider effects, and the like, when the impartial legislator can do a better
job. 116
Once again, the intrastate example illustrates my point. If New
York sets up an intrastate welfare program, then some rich New Yorkers
may emigrate; some poor out-of-staters may immigrate; and some other
states may "free ride" on New York's efforts by reducing their own pro-
grams, in the hope that their own needy will leave. For these very rea-
sons, certain fiscal federalists have argued against redistributive state
spending programs, such as state welfare.I 7 But surely the fiscal federal-
ist's argument is a policy argument. Surely the Constitution does not
decide for the New York legislators that they should eschew intrastate
redistribution. Similarly, the Constitution does not require fiscal paro-
chialism simply because a state program of interstate redistribution
would cause dynamic effects.
The parochialist has one final argument.
By not requiring state lawmakers to be always looking over their
shoulders for foreign interests and always calculating the propor-
tionate incidence of benefits and burdens, we make legislation a
possible task for lawmakers with less expertise and less administra-
tive support available to them than Congress has. 1 8
This particular defense of state parochialism operates at a higher level of
generality than the others discussed here. It points to the very process of
impartial decisionmaking and argues that this process itself is costly, in-
dependent of the outcome. Until now, I have discussed various reasons
(dynamic effects and democratic obligations, for example) that might
116. To be sure, the state legislator might not be impartial. But this possibility does not
help the parochialist, as I tried to explain above, see supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
Assume that an impartial legislator would be more competent in evaluating migration effects,
free rider effects, and the like. If so, doesn't the Framer have good reason to create a duty of
impartiality with respect to fiscal decisions, in the hopes that the state legislator will abide by
this duty? Why is the possibility that the legislator will ignore the duty a reason to require
fiscal parochialism?
117. See sources cited supra note 103.
118. Regan, supra note 1, at 1165-66.
preclude a particular outcome: redistribution. But certain reasons (pro-
cess costs) might preclude the state legislator from even considering re-
distribution. The weighing of outsiders' redistributive claims might be a
difficult and expensive task, and this expense might not be justified.
At this point, it is important to remember my definition of "imparti-
ality." The "impartial" legislator gives equal weight to outsiders' inter-
ests, ceteris paribus, at some level of generality.119 In other words,
"impartiality" means this:
a) giving equal weight to the well-being of out-of-staters ceteris
paribus, or
b) adopting a different decision procedure only if you first decide to
do that by giving equal weight to the well-being of out-of-staters,
ceteris paribus.
The legislator's primary decision is whether the state should take a cer-
tain course of action, for example, to share the fisc with out-of-staters.
The impartial legislator can ignore out-of-state interests in making cer-
tain primary decisions if the legislator makes an impartial meta-decision
that this decision procedure is justified for these particular kinds of pri-
mary decisions (or an impartial meta-meta-decision that a different meta-
decision procedure is justified, and so forth). Process costs and the like
are simply reasons that are relevant to the legislator's meta-decision,
"Should I resolve this particular primary decision by giving equal weight,
ceteris paribus, to out-of-state interests?"
The principle that state legislators can meta-decide to ignore out-of-
state interests in particular contexts is analogous to the principle that
administrative agencies can choose between adjudication and rulemak-
ing. A benefit-conferring agency might determine that persons who lack
certain characteristics do not merit benefits as a general rule, and more-
over that a case-by-case determination of their merit would be very ex-
pensive. Thus the agency promulgates a rule that "these characteristics
are a necessary condition for benefits." This is analogous to the state
legislator's meta-decision that "I should ignore out-of-state interests in
resolving this primary decision." Just as the agency administrator can
refuse to adjudicate the benefit-claims of persons who lack certain thresh-
old characteristics, so the legislator can give zero weight to out-of-state
interests in choosing the state's course of action - assuming that the
administrator and legislator have adopted this decision procedure
impartially. 120
119. See supra text accompanying note 7.
120. See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 206-09, 222-
53 (1985); Diver, supra note 94, at 66-80; see also JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS
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In short, the impartial legislator can decide against even considering
certain kinds of redistribution if there are good reasons for this meta-
decision. The legislator must evaluate the costs and benefits of consider-
ing redistribution. The costs include process costs; the benefits include
accuracy, for out-of-staters may have valid redistributive claims. What
the parochialist needs to argue is that the Framers have undertaken this
cost-benefit meta-analysis and that by their calculation the costs of con-
sidering redistribution outweigh the benefits. But this argument, again, is
open to my oft-repeated objection. Why would the Framers make the
meta-decision, rather than leaving it to the legislator? Isn't this decision
a policy decision? The Constitution gives agency administrators the dis-
cretion to engage in adjudication rather than rulemaking. Equivalently,
the Constitution gives state legislators the discretion to take an impartial
point of view in considering redistribution.
B. The Argument in General
Would the Framers choose the parochialist model over the model of
state impartiality? Would they draft the rule "state legislators should
ignore out-of-state interests absent some federal side constraint"? I have
tried to show why the Framers would not draft a core instance of the
parochialist rule: "state legislators should ignore out-of-staters' redistrib-
utive claims." A fortiori, they would not draft the rule.
In the preceding section, I tried to illustrate the different kind of
arguments for state parochialism. One is that Congress takes care of in-
terstate problems. The second is that the state legislator's role-as the
elected representative of the state citizenry, or as a member of the thick
state community-entails a parochial point of view. The third is that
out-of-state interests do not ultimately bear on some state decision, in-
dependent of the legislator's role.
The first argument supposes that Congress will coordinate and ca-
nalize state parochialism. Congress will appropriately constrain the
state's decision so that the course of action chosen by a parochial state
legislator will redound to the benefit of all U.S. citizens. The "fiscal fed-
eralism" theory epitomizes this idea. According to this theory, Congress
can ensure that the state's parochial spending decisions will effect the
appropriate outcome-appropriate from a national point of view-by en-
larging or reducing the state fisc to account for outsiders' redistributive
and corrective claims, and by using monetary transfers or direct regula-
tion to internalize the external costs and benefits of the state's spending
(1984) (discussing how individual rationality often involves a meta-decision to ignore certain
factors).
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This kind of theory neatly accounts for the side-constraint model. It
neatly explains why the state legislator should ignore outside interests,
absent some specific federal rule. To comply with those rules and no
more is just to work within the framework created by Congress (and the
Constitution). Congress has fine tuned those rules so that outsiders' in-
terests are brought to bear where they need to be, and nowhere else.
Congress sets up the structure on the assumption that state legislators
will generally seek to optimize the well-being of in-staters, and this is
exactly what legislators should do.
Perhaps the parochialist's view of Congress would be plausible if
there were a limited number of "interstate problems," some small group
of state decisions that affected out-of-staters. But the modem, post-New
Deal view of federalism is that outsiders are (potentially) affected by
every state decision. The state has broad authority over outsiders, under
the rubric of territorial jurisdiction: it regulates, taxes and adjudicates
their in-state activities. 122 Moreover, the state's exercise of its authority
over in-staters may well implicate out-of-state interests. This is the lesson
of New Deal cases like Wickard v. Filburn,123 which gave Congress virtu-
ally unlimited regulatory jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause, and
of the parallel cases that expanded congressional taxing and spending
authority. 124 Congress now has the power to promulgate every kind of
regulation, including those that were once thought to lie within the
state's exclusive "police" power, because every kind of regulatory prob-
lem may concern out-of-staters. 125 Congress now has plenary control
121. See sources cited supra note 103.
122. See supra note 14.
123. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
124. See supra note 102. See generally New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2419
(1992) (describing "[tihe Court's broad construction of Congress' power under the Commerce
and Spending Clauses").
125. The Tenth Amendment still limits Congress's power to restructure state government.
See New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992) (striking down federal statutory provi-
sion that compelled states to regulate); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 556 (1985) (leaving open "what affirmative limits the constitutional structure might im-
pose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause)); cf Gregory v. Ash-
croft, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (1991) (construing age discrimination statute to exempt state judges and
thus to avoid Tenth Amendment problem). But I think it is fair to say that the Tenth Amend-
ment no longer limits Congress's power over private persons. The state's authority, except its
authority over itself, is nowhere exclusive of Congress. See, e.g., New York v. United States,
112 S.Ct. 2408, 2420 (1992) ("Most of our recent cases interpreting the Tenth Amendment
have concerned the authority of Congress to subject state governments to generally applicable
laws."); Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976) ("It is one thing to recog-
nize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating individual businesses .... It is quite
another to uphold a similar exercise of congressional authority directed, not to private citizens,
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over in-staters' resources, because outsiders may have the full range of
corrective and redistributive claims on those resources. In the modem,
post-New Deal period, there is virtually no realm of exclusive state au-
thority; there is virtually no decision that is open to the states but not
Congress. This implies that every state decision arguably affects outsid-
ers; for if the decision were clearly "local," then it should not lie within
Congress's authority.
Since every state decision potentially affects outsiders, it is wholly
implausible that Congress can or will create a comprehensive framework
for state parochialism. That task would overwhelm the most conscien-
tious Member of Congress. A conscientious Congress could not hope to
coordinate every kind of state decision or to produce a coordinating
framework that reflected each state's special features. Nor is there any
reason to think that Members of Congress will be conscientious. This is
perhaps the most glaring oversight in the "fiscal federalism" theory. The
parochialist assumes that state legislators will ignore outsiders because
that is the "reality" of politics, but then blithely posits impartial action
by Congress.
Finally, as illustrated by the example of interstate redistribution, the
idea of Congress authoritatively "solving" interstate problems falsely as-
sumes a normative consensus among U.S. citizens. It falsely assumes
that the citizens of the different states agree upon how out-of-state inter-
ests should be brought to bear in any particular case. But if some state
takes a dissenting view, then impartial state action may usefuilly supple-
ment action by an impartial Congress. Surely this is true if the out-of-
staters involved come from a state that also takes the dissenting view. In
that case, independent state action regarding the interstate problem
serves a fundamental aim of federalism: it enhances consent.
For all these reasons, the mere existence of Congress does not pro-
vide the impartial Framer sufficient ground to choose the parochialist
model over the model of state impartiality. This leaves the parochialist
two more options. The state legislator's role may oblige her to ignore
outsiders' interests; or she may have role-independent reasons for doing
SO.
If our federal system lacked decentralized political communities, if it
were composed of "territorial agencies" instead of states, then the agency
administrators would only have role-independent reasons to distinguish
between residents and nonresidents. Imagine an administrative subdivi-
sion with territorial boundaries and the same territorial jurisdiction as a
but to the States as States."), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
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state, but where the administrator is appointed by the President rather
than elected by the agency residents, and no "political community" is
connected to the territory. Would the Framers require territorial-agency
parochialism? Would they instruct the territorial administrator, "Ignore
nonresidents' interests with respect to these particular decisions"? Per-
haps the Framers would. Perhaps it is quite clear that nonresidents do
not have a legitimate interest in the decisions, and moreover that the
Framers are best suited to assess the legitimacy of nonresidents' interests.
The fact that nonresidents have no legitimate interest in the decisions
would then be a role-independent reason for parochialism. It would hold
true despite the absence of an agency community in which the adminis-
trator has some role. But the Framers could not have any role-depen-
dent reasons for legitimating agency parochialism just because the
Constitution does not create such a community. The Framers could not
decide that the administrator owes a democratic obligation to the resi-
dents qua electors or a communitarian obligation to the residents qua
fellow members of a "thick" community.
The notion of territorial-agency parochialism is counterintuitive.
Our intuition is that state parochialism proceeds from the legislator's role
in the state political community, and this intuition helps explain the side-
constraint model. Under that model, the Constitution does not contain a
piecemeal parochialist rule: "ignore out-of-state interests with respect to
decisions D1, D2 ..... " Rather, the rule is much more sweeping: "ignore
out-of-state interests, absent some federal side constraint." But the
Framer would not promulgate such a rule for the territorial administra-
tor. Such a rule presupposes that the legislator has a parochial role, or
that Congress has fully accounted for out-of-state interests, and not
merely that out-of-state interests are irrelevant to certain particular deci-
sions facing the legislator.
In Part II.A, I tried to show why the Framers would not have role-
dependent reasons for choosing the parochialist model. In my view, the
Constitution does not enact a narrow conception of the legislator's role.
The legislator does not by virtue of the Constitution have a democratic or
communitarian obligation to advance the citizens' narrowly defined in-
terests even if the citizens are themselves impartial. Such an obligation
would be quite paradoxical because it would preclude a democratic com-
munity from consenting to moral action. The legislator may have a con-
tingent democratic obligation to advance the citizens' interests,
contingent on certain political facts, for example, a vehement demand by
the state citizenry. But the Constitution does not decide for the legislator
that these political facts indeed obtain, nor does it instruct the legislator
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to ignore outsiders regardless of the political facts. There is a crucial gap
between the legislator's democratic or communitarian obligations and
the parochialist rule. What creates this gap is the possibility that state
citizens will approve and acknowledge the legitimate interests of
outsiders.
The parochialist's final, and I think least intuitive, argument is that
the Framers have role-independent reasons for framing a parochial
rule-reasons that are tied to particular legislative decisions and not to
the legislator's role. The simplest role-independent reason for requiring
parochialism with respect to a particular decision is that out-of-staters
have no legitimate interest in that decision. For example, as I discussed
above, the parochialist might argue that out-of-staters have no legitimate
interest in the state's fiscal decision where in-staters have contributed the
underlying funds.126 If out-of-staters have no legitimate interest in the
decision, if their well-being takes no legitimate weight, then the state leg-
islator will reach an appropriate outcome by ignoring outsiders. And if
the Framer is more competent in evaluating out-of-state interests than
the conscientious legislator, the Framer should perhaps guarantee that
outcome by requiring the legislator to take a parochial point of view with
respect to the decision.
There are various other kinds of role-independent reasons. First,
there are more complex explanations why legislators will reach an accu-
rate outcome if they ignore out-of-staters. In-staters' legitimate interests
may outweigh the out-of-staters'. In-staters may virtually represent out-
of-staters.1"7 State parochialism may constitute a hidden hand pro-
126. More precisely, out-of-staters have no legitimate interest in the choice between spend-
ing programs that do not otherwise implicate their interests. If the state legislator is choosing
between a welfare program and a public works project that will spew pollution out-of-state,
then the out-of-stater is legitimately interested in this choice.
127. In-staters virtually represent out-of-staters with respect to some decision by the state
legislator if the two groups have the same pattern of interests in that decision. If so, legislators
will reach the same outcome whether they consider the interests of all U.S. citizens or only the
interests of in-staters.
Virtual representation is quite contingent. It is not sufficient that out-of-staters and in-
staters divide into the same categories. These categories must represent the same percentages
of the two populations, and the intensity of their legitimate claims also must be identical. If
the categories are linked to residency, as is often the case, then virtual representation is un-
likely, and the legislator will reach a more accurate outcome by considering out-of-state inter-
ests. For example, the decision to require safety devices in state factories implicates the
interests of factory owners, workers, and consumers. Unless residents and nonresidents divide
equally among all three categories, or unless the legislator makes the normative decision to
ignore those categories where the proportions are different, the parochial outcome will over-
represent the workers' interests and underrepresent the consumers' interests.
John Hart Ely and other "representation reinforcement" theorists exaggerate the impor-
tance of virtual representation. They tend to assume that a group is "virtually represented" if
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cess. 12 S The dynamics of the interstate system may preclude a generous
outcome. Second, there are higher-level reasons against an impartial de-
cision procedure, such as the process costs of evaluating outsiders'
interests.
But role-independent reasons would at best support the piecemeal
rule "ignore out-of-state interests with respect to decisions DI, )2, "...
and not the general rule "ignore out-of-state interests absent some federal
side-constraint." Unless you believe the fiscal federalism theory, the
mere absence of federal side constraints does not in itself mean that the
state legislator will reach a better outcome by ignoring out-of-state inter-
ests or that higher-order reasons require a parochial point of view. In
short, role-independent reasons cannot account for the side-constraint
model.
Moreover, role-independent reasons would not simply entail state
parochialism. They would also entail territorial-agency parochialism and
what might be called state pseudo-parochialism. If the Framers are best
suited to decide whether out-of-state interests determine some decision
by the state legislator, they are also probably best suited to decide
the legislator does not discriminate against that group. But as the safety-regulation example
demonstrates, out-of-staters and in-staters need not be symmetrically situated with respect to
the state legislator's choice between two nondiscriminatory statutes. See Brilmayer, Carolene,
Conflicts and the Fate of the "Insider-Outsider", supra note 66, at 1310-15 (criticizing Ely on
these grounds).
128. In a hidden hand process, parochial decisionmaking by every state leads to the out-
come that an impartial observer would approve. For example, interstate competition may
maximize national efficiency. Possible examples are the "race to the top" in corporate law,
where states vie to design the legal code that will maximize corporate profits, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Cor-
porate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); federal pork-barrel legislation, where
interest-bargaining between Members of Congress causes federal projects to be built in those
states that the projects will most enrich; and economic rivalry, where each state tries to attract
producers, who end up choosing the most profitable location. See generally THOMAS R. DYE,
AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990). The theme of in-
terstate competition is central to the public choice theory of federalism. See Charles Tiebout,
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956); LOCAL PROVISION OF
PUBLIC SERVICES: THE TIEBOUT MODEL AFTER 25 YEARS (George Zodrow ed. 1983); see
also VINCENT OSTROM, THE MEANING OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM: CONSTITUTING A
SELF-GOVERNING SOCIETY (1991). However, state competition does not necessarily maxi-
mize national efficiency, for example, if externalities are not internalized, and the state legisla-
tor may decide that some other norm trumps efficiency.
A hidden-hand process can also serve a distributive goal. Imagine that equal sharing is
the proper rule for distributing resource R-an impartial legislator would give every U.S. citi-
zen the same amount of R-and moreover the per-capita level of R is pretty much the same in
every state. Then, if every state reserves in-state R for state residents, every U.S. citizen will
receive the right amount of R. However, many resources are not distributed with the same
per-capita level from state to state, and equal sharing may not be the right distributive rule.
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whether those interests determine some territorial-agency decision. Yet
we intuit that a territorial-agency administrator should be impartial
among U.S. citizens, no less so than the real-world administrators whose
jurisdiction is defined in terms of subject-matter rather than territory.
Moreover, role-independent reasons do not merely distinguish between
state residents and nonresidents. They also distinguish between "work-
ers" (those who work in-state, including commuting nonresidents) and
"nonworkers" (those who work out-of-state, including commuting resi-
dents). Workers may well have a trumping interest in certain regulatory
issues (for example, factory safety), as against consumers or business-
owners. Yet no one imagines that the Constitution contains the pseudo-
parochialist rule, "ignore nonworkers' interests with respect to decisions
D1, D 2, . . ."
Why not? Before framing the rule "ignore nonresidents' interests
(or nonworkers' interests) with respect to decision D1," the Framer
would have to have role-independent reasons why nonresidents' (or
nonworkers') interests are irrelevant to D, as well as a good reason why
the impartial legislator is not suited to assess those role-independent rea-
sons. Perhaps these two conditions do hold true in certain special cases.
But they do not hold true very often, or so I will argue.
Let us focus again on the simplest kind of role-independent reason:
that out-of-staters have no legitimate interest in a particular decision.
Equivalently, this decision is "local": it only implicates the legitimate
interests of in-staters. The question, then, is whether the Framer would
identify certain decisions as "local."
Wickard v. Filburn129 says no. Once more, this point is crucial:
under the post-New Deal Constitution, there is virtually no realm of ex-
clusive state authority. Virtually every decision open to the state legisla-
tor is also open to Congress. Therefore the Constitution does not define
any particular state decision as "local": if some decision were thus de-
fined, it should lie outside Congress's power. But the Constitution is no
longer understood to restrict congressional authority relative to the
states. The Constitution is no longer read to delimit the areas where out-
of-staters lack legitimate interests.
130
129. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
130. Because the states do retain exclusive authority under the Tenth Amendment to make
certain decisions concerning the structure of state government, see supra note 125, the Tenth
Amendment might be read to embody a rule about the relative priority of in-state and out-of-
state interests: "although out-of-staters have an interest in the structure of state government,
the in-staters' interest is weightier." If so, does the Tenth Amendment require the state legisla-
tor to ignore out-of-state interests in structuring state government? Perhaps not. Even if the
Framer believes that in-state interests trump out-of-state interests with respect to the structure
This is another crucial difference between states and nation-states.
The Constitution does not define "local" issues just because the United
States is a political community. The citizens of the various states are all
U.S. citizens, and they have the full range of connections that a political
community engenders. They belong to a common society and economy
and are full participants in a common political system. Each state is
integrated with the others in complex ways, and it is therefore a difficult
and controversial question whether out-of-staters lack legitimate
claims." '3 The legislator (national or state) is better suited than the
Framer to answer this question; it should be left to the political process.
By contrast, if the United States were simply a confederation, without a
national community, society, or economy, the lines of separation between
"local" and "interstate" problems might be quite clear. The Framer,
then, might be competent to define the range of legitimate interests held
by out-of-staters.
If the Framers would not define "local" issues, then, a fortiori, they
would not rely upon other role-independent reasons for state parochial-
ism. Surely the conscientious legislator is better suited to decide that
out-of-staters are "virtually represented," that state parochialism consti-
tutes a hidden hand process, and so forth. These scenarios are more con-
tingent, more dependent on contingent normative and empirical
premises, than the simple case where outsiders lack legitimate interests.
I cannot imagine why the existence of a hidden hand or of "process
costs" should be a matter of constitutional law even though the existence
of a "local" decision is matter of policy.
Conclusion
This Article is addressed to the conscientious state legislator-the
state legislator who strives to honor constitutional norms, even those that
the federal courts will not enforce. I have argued that this legislator
would always give equal weight to the out-of-stater's well-being, ceteris
paribus, at some level of generality. The core of my argument is the im-
of state government, the Framer could disable Congress from structuring state government
(because Members of Congress are likely to undervalue these in-state interests) without requir-
ing state legislators to take a parochial point of view (because state legislators are not likely to
undervalue in-state interests). The state legislator is better suited than the Framer, or the
Member of Congress, to decide whether in-state interests indeed take priority.
131. John Rawls's view in A Theory of Justice is that two persons have obligations of dis-
tributive justice to each other only if they are involved in some scheme of cooperation. JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Where society A and society B are wholly separate, an
increment in the wealth of some member of society A need not benefit the least-well-off mem-
ber of society B. See THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIIMNG RAWLS 240-80 (1989) (discussing and
criticizing this aspect of A Theory of Justice).
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aginative exercise elaborated in Part II. Imagine that the Framer is
choosing between the impartiality model and the model of state parochi-
alism where legislators ignore outsiders' interests absent some federal
side-constraint. Which option would the Framer choose? I have tried to
answer with a concrete example, the example of positive rights, and then
to generalize. In brief, my answer is this: it may well be true that out-of-
state interests should not determine some decision by the state legislator,
but the Framer has no good reason to resolve that issue for the legislator.
The Framer should choose the parochialist model only if out-of-state in-
terests are not determinative to various state decisions and the state legis-
lator should be thus instructed. But why should the Constitution contain
such an instruction? The impartial state legislator will give zero weight
to out-of-state interests where that is the weight those interests merit, and
the legislator is better suited than the Framer to decide whether the inter-
ests are indeed insubstantial.
